

The JOURNAL of the

AMERICAN MILITARY
INSTITUTE

VOLUME III
1939



KRAUS REPRINT CO.
New York
1972

21 August 1980

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A U.S. Division of Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited

Printed in Germany

The JOURNAL of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

VOL. III

SPRING, 1939

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The JOURNAL is published quarterly by the American Military Institute, 1916 R Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., (formerly the American Military History Foundation), which supplies one copy of each issue to all members without charge. Yearly subscription, \$3.00; single numbers, \$.75. The Institute does not assume responsibility for statements of fact or of opinion made by contributors.

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Entered as second-class matter January 7, 1938, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of August 24, 1912.



A marauder of the late sixteenth century. From a contemporary woodcut by J. Amman in the Germanic Museum, Nuremberg.

MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

By Colonel John W. Wright

BEFORE THE seventeenth century, the march of an army through hostile territory was accompanied by scenes of horror. Inferior roads and a primitive system of transportation made it impossible for an army to carry its rations, so the troops were compelled to live on the country. Heraldng the advance of an army and encircling its flanks were swarms of undisciplined light-horse, rascals known as *stradiots* and *argoulets*, charged with gathering supplies, adept in the arts of looting and arson; and the route of the advancing host was marked by smoke and flame. To justify such conduct, there was the Roman maxim that war should nourish war; but more potent still was the grim law of necessity. Vattel said that a belligerent could deprive his enemy of everything that augmented his strength and take from him his means of resistance.¹

But this stupid destruction reacted upon the invader: so completely was it accomplished that he found himself in want. Gradually a new and more enlightened method came into use, a method that while not denying the right of a victor to his booty, provided for an orderly system of collecting and for preventing waste. It was known as the system of contributions.² The substitution of contributions for the ancient pillage was a gradual process that did not become common until about the end of the seventeenth century; but it was one of the most important steps in advancing civilization.³ This change was furthered by the adoption of the system of regular armies as permanent establishments which called for disciplined men.

The collection of contributions was assisted by a custom that appeared during the long wars of Louis XIV. Sovereigns engaged in war entered into treaties or conventions regulating collections and confining them to a supportable basis. They determined in advance the extent of hostile territory where demands could be made, the amount that could be collected, and the system to be followed by the collecting parties. These detachments of troops for making collections should not consist of less than twelve men and they were required to have with them written orders and instructions. The old pillagers, the terror of the peasants,

¹ Emeric de Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, ed. Chitty (Phila., 1883), bk. III, ch. ix.

² The military writers of the eighteenth century and Vattel used the term "contributions" for all forms of military exactions, whether for money, goods or labor. Today we distinguish between contributions, demands for money, and requisitions, demands for goods or labor. In this paper the writer for convenience will use the term contributions for every kind of military exactions. The instructions for the conduct of an American army in collecting contributions appear in *Basic Field Manual*, vol. VII (Military Law), pt. 2, "Rules of Land Warfare" (Washington, 1934), 78-81.

³ The importance of this change is discussed in L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, (London, 1921), II, pt. 2, ch. 7.

plying their trade under the guise of forage for the army, were now hanged on the nearest tree.⁴

An application of these treaties is found in a letter from Louis XIV to the Duke of Vendôme, August 1, 1707. The king desiring to transfer elsewhere some men from the duke's command in Flanders, directed them to be withdrawn from the garrison of certain fortified lines, which, said the king, could be weakened as parties of the enemy were prohibited by the last treaties from crossing there.⁵

Under treaty made by France with Württemberg in July, 1707, a definite sum of money was to be paid to the invading French army. The price of flour was fixed; and the amount consumed by the troops, the value of houses, barns and other construction damaged by French troops, and the value of all articles pillaged, were charged against the general sum. No deductions were made for camp sites or for forage consumed by the cavalry. Finally, the French commander agreed to guarantee the safety of all inhabitants.⁶

A province threatened with invasion took every measure to guard the property of the inhabitants. In September, 1709, while Marshal d'Harcourt commanded in Alsace he feared the Imperial army would cross the Rhine, so he directed his *intendant* to take the usual precautionary measures. This he did by means of an *ordonnance* issued in the name of the king. It directed that all wheat, rye, barley, oats and hay be deposited in the walled towns of Belfort, Huningue, Vieux Brisach, Neuf Brisach, Schlestadt, Strasbourg, Fort Louis, or Haguenau, under penalty of imprisonment and confiscation. A supply for one month could be retained for the immediate use of the people, to be renewed from month to month from the walled towns, provided it was stored in a public granary, a market place, or in a parochial church. No grain would be stored in chateaux, cloisters, schools or country estates.⁷

The function of the *intendant* of the army was to draw up in form the demands of the invading force addressed to the provinces and cities, and these demands extended to all the country over which a city had jurisdiction. The *intendant* dealt only with the civil authorities as contributions were matters for regulation by civil officials. The invading army took no direct part unless contributions were refused, when force became necessary. To collect from isolated populations, in districts far removed from the cities, where the central civil authorities could

⁴ Vattel, *op. cit.*, bk. III, ch. ix.

⁵ Collection de documents inédits sur l'*histoire de France*, publiés par ordre du Roi: *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1834-1841), VII, 40. This collection in eleven volumes was made by Lieut. Gen. de Vault (1717-1790) while he was in charge of the *Dépôt de la guerre*. Their publication was directed by Gen. Pelet, later in charge of the *Dépôt*. The volumes contain correspondence of Louis XIV, of his ministers and generals; studies of war plans, orders of battle and march orders. A splendid collection of maps accompanies the work. It was de Vault who conducted the French military correspondence during the American Revolution. Hereinafter cited as *Collection de documents inédits*.

⁶ *Bulletin du comité des travaux historique et scientifique* (Paris, 1883), 23. The complete convention appears here.

⁷ Collection de documents inédits, IX, 462-469. The entire *ordonnance* appears here.

exercise no control, was the task of the invading troops, as here violences could not be dispensed with. Of course, a marching army required supplies that frequently had to be seized without waiting for the orderly process through the civil authorities; but this was exceptional. Frequently an army reached out to collect from distant provinces with whom no agreement had as yet been reached; here collections were made by the hussars.⁸ Cavalry sent out to enforce contributions, reaching an open town, went immediately to the mayor and presented their written demands. This document closed with what was known as the threat of military execution. In the French service the threat was expressed in the ominous words that unless the exactions were complied with, the town would be "*mise à sac, à feu, et à sang de la ville et de son territoire*"—the demands would be enforced by sack, fire and blood. Leaving behind this terrible threat, the hussars rode away, not forgetting to take with them as hostages several of the important and wealthy citizens.⁹ Small towns and villages and the adjoining country were required to furnish grain, meal, flour, cattle, oil, and wine; the larger communities were called upon for manufactured goods—shoes, clothing, powder and lead. Towns with large ovens were called upon for bread. The wealthier places paid handsome sums of money. Laborers were collected through the civil authorities to construct roads and bridges, to fell timber, to build winter quarters for the army. They raised fortifications, and, at a siege, worked on the lines of circumvallation, or furnished the land and water transport to move the ponderous siege pieces, their great bombs and iron projectiles. Troops quartered in cities occupied first the public buildings and then, if necessary, were billeted in the private houses where they were entitled to "a bed, a candle, and a place by the fire." Sometimes they were rationed by their host.

When a province or city once agreed to pay the contributions, the customs of war demanded a strict compliance.¹⁰ Walled towns, however, could not be assessed by a handful of hussars. Their walls lent power and dignity. They had first to be attacked in due form, their walls battered by the artillery. In 1734 a French army under Berwick crossed the Rhine and demanded contributions. Frankfort replied

⁸ Hussars originated in Hungary and appeared in western Europe about the middle of the seventeenth century wearing their distinctive national costume which has been but little changed today. They were the successors of the *stradiots* and the *argoulets* as the lightest of cavalry. They were not disciplined like cavalry of the line, nor were they trained to maneuver in bodies. They moved in swarms and were much like the Cossacks when Napoleon invaded Russia. One can well understand the implication in Franklin's proclamation to the inhabitants of certain counties in Pennsylvania in 1755 when he wished them to rent their wagons and horses to Braddock's army. He closed with the words that unless the army secured transportation he would have to report to the general, in which event, "I suppose Sir John St. Clair, the hussar, with a body of soldiers, will immediately enter the province." This reference to the hussars was not lost upon the immigrants.

⁹ Irénée Lamière, *Les occupations militaires en Italie pendant les guerres de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1903), 107.

¹⁰ Vattel said: "Thus also, the country people, the inhabitants of villages or defenseless towns, are bound to pay the contributions which they have promised in order to save themselves from pillage." *Op. cit.*, bk. III, ch. xvi.



THE FIRST HUSSARS
A drawing by L. Vallet in Album de l'Armée française (Paris, 1902).

to a demand by a message that she was a fortified city and would defend her walls; if the Marshal-Duke of Berwick wished contributions from Frankfort, let his siege guns speak.¹¹

The collection of contributions was governed by the customs of war. One of our best sources for a study of the subject is found in the military authors, provided they were men of rank who commanded large bodies of troops in the field. Military writers of the eighteenth century as a rule have little to say on this subject as it was not related to strategy or tactics; but fortunately there are three books written by experienced generals that show not only methods but give us the point of view of the times. Two of these are Frenchmen and one is a Spaniard. The oldest was born in 1648, and the youngest died in 1750.

The Marquis de Feuquiére opens his chapter on this subject with the statement that war is so expensive to a prince that before engaging in it he should investigate the state of his finances and come to a clear understanding with his general who is to command the army, and so arrange that there will be a flow of money from hostile contributions.¹² There are two kinds of contributions, those of labor and goods, and those of money. The first include such things as grain, meat, water and land transportation, timber and other necessities of the army. Then there is forced labor. Demands for contributions should be extended over as broad an area as possible to increase the yield and to distribute the loss. To properly assess a country, one must have an exact knowledge of its resources, the variety of the crops, their location, the location of factories. Collections from large cities and towns and from their immediately surrounding territory can be made with little difficulty, usually no force is required here; but in distant parts of the country, away from the army, force is necessary. It is possible, however, to collect from regions that are protected by wide rivers and by fortresses; but this is possible only through a system of terror. The marquis recommended for this purpose the use of disguised incendiaries (*incendiaries déguisés*). These work alone or in small groups. They kidnap important citizens of the locality and hold them as hostages; or they may prefer to intimidate by burning large houses.¹³

The Spanish Vizconde de Puerto has much to say on the subject.¹⁴ He was a man of the highest character and, as beffited a Spanish noble of the time, a pious son of the church. His death was heroic, leading his troops in battle; yet, reflecting the views of his times, his counsel on this subject appears to us today as the echo from a barbaric age—a fact true of all three of the works referred to. He observes

¹¹ P. Massuet, *Histoire de la guerre présente* (Amsterdam, 1735), 231.

¹² Antoine de Pas, Marquis de Feuquiére (1648-1711), lieutenant-general; served under Luxembourg, Turenne, Crequi and Catinat; author of *Mémoires de M. le Marquis de Feuquiére*, 2 vol. (Amsterdam, 1741).

¹³ *Mémoires*, op. cit., II, 292-300.

¹⁴ D. Alvaro de Navia Osirio, Vizconde de Puerto, Marques de Santa-Cruz de Marcenado (1684-1732), lieutenant-general in the War of the Spanish Succession, ambassador at the Congress of Soissons, a writer of considerable merit. His *Reflexiones militares* in eleven volumes appeared between 1724-1730 and is probably the most complete work on the art of war ever written. Cf. Miguel Carrasco-Labadia, *El Marques de Santa-Cruz de Marcenado* (Madrid, 1889).

that a prince can support in a war of invasion a much larger army than when he is on the defensive, as in hostile territory his army should cost him nothing. The Vizconde is a sturdy proponent of the use of contributions, and we must confess that his views are supported by unimpeachable precedence. He reminds us that when the Israelites crossed the desert manna was rained upon them, but when they reached the land of Canaan this bounty ceased because Jehovah expected His chosen people to live on contributions. It is a principle, he says, to collect as large sums as possible and thereby ruin the enemy. If forced to abandon a country before the assessments are paid, take with your army by force as hostages the most important and wealthiest men. When the country people, to avoid paying the exactions, abandon their farms, burn the farms. If you have no time to take hostages, destroy the country.¹⁵ The writer shows what an enterprising garrison can accomplish. In 1709 the troops in Tortosa were about to abandon the place, but first they sent out detachments which in fourteen hours collected a group of hostages who were forced to purchase their relief for sixteen thousand *doublons*.

Our next author lived during the reign of Louis XV—Maurice, Count of Saxe.¹⁶ He is fully persuaded that an experienced general will always take good care, by means of requisitions, to support his army at the expense of the enemy. Saxe was a practical man and he considered what was the best system to collect contributions without unduly fatiguing his hussars. His system was this. Letters signed by the commander-in-chief threatening military execution should be distributed demanding supplies and money. This, the Count explains, will give the towns "an opportunity to contemplate." The next step is to send out cavalry detachments under orders to march only at night and so time their march that they will reach the town, their objective, at dark. Two of their party are sent at once to the mayor to whom the demands are presented and a receipt obtained. If the supplies or money are refused, the cavalry should set fire to some detached houses and retire with the threat that they will soon return and burn the town. This method, says the count, is very effective as the inhabitants in the end always pay. Follow this system, he promises, and all towns within a hundred leagues will not fail to bring to the army the stipulated sums. The Count then adds that "nothing can be more entertaining than these excursions, and the soldiers themselves will certainly take pleasure in them."¹⁷

Before large cities or provinces agreed to furnish contributions their officials

¹⁵ *Reflexiones Militaires*, vol. IV, bk. 9, ch. 18, 281; vol. IX, bk. 17.

¹⁶ Maurice, Count of Saxe (1696-1750); marshal of France; victor of Fontenoy. His memoirs, published in 1732, were translated into English and appeared as *Reveries or Memoirs Upon the Art of War* (London, 1757).

¹⁷ *Reveries*, op. cit., bk II, ch. 2. These suggestions of Saxe came to the attention of Napoleon 1st in 1812 while the never ending war in Spain was absorbing the resources of his empire. He was so impressed that he dictated the following note to Berthier: "Paris, Jan. 6, 1812. There will be found in the Reveries of Marshal Saxe, among other things extremely common-place, some good suggestions on the method of collecting contributions without fatiguing the army. Read them and prepare similar instructions for my generals in Spain." *Correspondance de Napoléon 1er* (Paris, 1868), XXIII, 152.



Soß hainj ghetredet schon jett will j Stüffel biß a
Herrschaffet was hr willt, manz mir brünschä leu nüd
I gib als gerat Kuch Goissa Schoß usd pömer.
Nau' mir aufs Jahr vord' frid, darwill j lüttig seir.

Ja Valler bring herben Fleisch Toback Brod ic Dier
Ein gut Glas branden roem, damit es nich nicht frier,
Sei Haber Stroh vorz' lisen, schaff mir auch etwag zu

The soldier in quarters. An eighteenth century engraving by E. Bück in the Germanic Museum, Nuremberg.

very often asked to consult with their sovereign, and this was usually granted. The prince could not object to his subjects saving their homes from pillage by means of these payments.¹⁸ It was customary before assessing provinces and large cities to call for the tax books for the preceding three years, examine them, and then assess the equivalent of the royal tax for one year.¹⁹

During the War of the Spanish Succession the French raised in Flanders a line of field works known as the Lines of Villeroy, extending along a front of two hundred and fifty miles. Three years were required to complete them. One of the main reasons given at the time for this large construction was that it would bring peace to northern France from parties of hostile troops demanding contributions. Feuquiére says that these lines proved worthless for this purpose because to exact contributions it was necessary for only a small party to penetrate the lines once; and even though the party were driven out they usually had sufficient time to deliver their demands and secure a receipt which thereupon became an obligation. If the payment was not collected during the course of the war, the claim was presented at the peace table where all such claims were balanced and settled in the treaty.

Vendôme in 1707 wished to build some defensive lines connecting Lille and Tournay; but their construction was bitterly opposed by the *Chatellenie* of Lille. They appealed to the king with the plea that the lines would be useless to them now as they had been visited by parties from the Allies demanding contributions and they were already under obligations to pay. To construct lines at this late date, they complained, would be a needless expense, exhausting their slender resources.²⁰

The campaign of Marshal Villars in Germany, 1707, is a perfect example of the abuse of contributions, and it affords an excellent study as there is much accessible material.²¹ The maneuvers of the French had but little relation to the opposing force as the governing motive of Villars was to exact the most from the country and to this end he moved from place to place.

¹⁸ There is a footnote in Vattel, *op. cit.*, bk. III, ch. viii, to the effect that in 1593 the Spanish authorities in the Low Countries gave orders that all who paid contributions to the rebels should be put to death; but this had to be changed as "the Spaniards were obliged to reestablish these indispensible usages . . . , the payment of contributions to avert pillage and devastation. (Grotius, *History of the Netherlands*, bk. III)."

¹⁹ Irénée Lamière, *op. cit.*, 68, 92, 282.

²⁰ *Collection de documents inédits*, VII, 307-14. This correspondence is very enlightening. The city of Lille was already subject to contributions and by no means wished to be charged with the expense and labor of constructing lines. But to the south of Lille were the French provinces of Artois and Picardy, not yet under obligation to contribute to the Allies, and they were anxious for the lines to be constructed. The intendant of Lille pointed out that small parties of the enemy could slip through the lines at night, crossing its wet-ditch—which was to be thirty feet wide and six feet deep—on a simple plank. This correspondence brings to light that wars in the eighteenth century were carried on by two simultaneous activities, the combats of armies in the field and the exactions of contributions.

²¹ In *Collection de documents inédits*, VII, is a succinct record of the military events (185-280) and a collection of accompanying documents, published in full from the archives. As this campaign was widely discussed in France, the most reliable writers of memoirs refer to the events: *Les grands écrivains de la France: Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, A. de Boislisle,



Foraging in the late eighteenth century. A contemporary engraving in the Folk Museum, Munich.

Villars crossed the Rhine in April and forced the celebrated lines of Stollhofen; then moved his army down the river valley. In May he wrote to the king giving his general plans.²² It was his intention to force the small German states on the Rhine into a neutrality "that they would never dare to break."

I shall march towards the enemy if they remain between my army and the Necker; but if they move in rear of Heilbronne, I wish, Sire, to move straight on Heidelberg and Manheim and commence by chastising the House of Hesse-Darmstadt . . . Followed by my pontoons, I wish to cross the Main, stopping only three days to chastise and impose large contributions upon the Landgrave of Hesse, to make repent this prince, his cousins of Darmstadt and the Elector Palatine . . . I shall be only eight days on this expedition when I shall turn upon the Duke of Württemberg who, in the mean time, will have time to reflect . . . When I say, Sire, chastise these princes, I do not mean to burn or devastate their estates, but to collect large sums of money to the profit of Your Majesty.

This plan received the hearty support of the court as France was in such a financial state that the king was greatly perplexed to find means to pay his troops. A reply to Villars was sent from the court by the Marquis de Chamlay,²³ who suggested that collecting parties should be sent out and reminded Villars that Württemberg, Baden, and other small states should be made to pay. But, he warned, the demands should not be excessive as these states, though rich in fruits

ed. (Paris, 1901), VII; *Journal du marquis de Dangeau*, F. B. Feuillet, de Conches, ed. (Paris, 1857), XI, XII; *Mémoires du marquis de Sourches*, Gabriel Jules, Comte de Cosnac and Edouard Pontal, eds. (Paris, 1891), X.

²² *Collection de documents inédits*, VII, 200-205. The entire letter is quoted here.

²³ Jules Louis Bolé, Marquis de Chamlay, occupied the post of *maréchal-général des logis des armées du roi*, or the confidential military adviser of the king. Cf. Dangeau, IV, 282-284.

of the soil, had but little trade. He then cautioned Villars not to permit a recurrence of the regrettable situation that arose in 1693 when *Monseigneur* penetrated into Württemberg, where the inhabitants, faced with large exactations, abandoned their homes, and the French army found no one to collect from. It is better to take little than to find nothing. In the Low Countries, he continued, it is different. Here the people never abandon their land and, owing to their extensive trade, they are able to pay well.²⁴

Villars now began what Saint-Simon called "*prodigieus brigandage.*" He wrote that he would collect as far as his hussars could travel; and they rode far and wide. They appeared before the cities of Nuremberg and Würzburg; they crossed the upper Danube, exacting large sums as far as Lake Constance. The court was made happy to hear that every day the cavalry was returning to Villars' headquarters bringing enormous quantities of flour and meat, and, above all, great sacks of coin; and with them came numbers of hostages to insure a complete settlement.²⁵

Villars forgot nothing. He actually forced from the enemy large sums that had been assessed during the campaign of 1703—four years before—but had not been collected because of the French retreat from Germany following their signal defeat at Blenheim.²⁶ Villars describes in his *Mémoires* a most remarkable incident that is illustrative of the customs of war during this period. He had called upon Stuttgart and Heidelberg for six thousand sacks of flour to be delivered at French headquarters. This order was not only carried out to the letter but the wagons hauling the sacks actually passed through the very center of the Imperial army, who did not dare to stop them and thus give Villars occasion to carry out the dire threat of military execution.

The court viewed these disgraceful proceedings with equanimity if not with pleasure; and Villars had the audacity to write to the king that he would use the money he collected to pay the army, to fill the treasury, and finally, to "*engraisser mon veau.*"²⁷

When the campaign closed, marked as it had been by the most flagrant example of looting Europe had seen in many years, the perpetrator returned to the French court. Here the Marshal-Duke of Villars, *chevalier des ordres du roi*, was given a gracious reception by His Most Christian Majesty and proceeded to embellish his magnificent chateau, Vaux de Fouquet, and to enlarge its broad acres with the newly acquired estate of Blandy.

There was much criticism. The Duke of Vendôme wrote a very frank letter to a minister of state and said that the officers of Villars army were writing that

²⁴ *Collection de documents inédits*, VII, 454-456. The entire letter appears here.

²⁵ Württemberg paid 2,200,000 *lères*; Douilach, 220,000 *livres*; Baden, 300,000 *livres*. Gmünd, 150,000 *livres*. These and many other assessments were in addition to an enormous quantity of provisions taken by the troops. Cf. Sourches, *op. cit.*, V, 331, 338, 342, 347; Dangeau, *op. cit.*, XI, 384, 389, 393, 401, 405; Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, XV, 180, 181-183, 609.

²⁶ *Nouvelle collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France: Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars*, Michand, ed. (Paris, 1857), 39.

²⁷ *Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars*, *op. cit.*, 161, 164. Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, XV, 182.

they were ashamed to be connected with such an expedition; that there would be no battle as Villars would not risk his booty; and that the army was weakened by the excessive number of troops placed on safeguard duty. The minister replied that Villars could be pardoned as he had sent to the king such large sums of money. Madame de Maintenon wrote her friend the Princess des Ursins in Spain that Villars was by no means a fool.²⁸ It was the general impression that Villars had acquired a large fortune by means of his contributions and safeguards.

The sale of safeguards was one of the most lucrative perquisites of a general-in-chief in a foreign country. Safeguards gave protection against the general's own troops. A safeguard was a simple order to the effect that the holder and his property were under the protection of the general; or, in addition, there was a guard of soldiers, usually selected from the general's personal guard. Soldiers on this duty were inviolable and if captured had to be returned to their own army. The price for safeguards varied. Saxe wrote that the sale of safeguards was an ancient institution, used by Prince Eugene and Marlborough who charged one *louis* a day, payable at their "chancellerie." There was always a charge for the simple safeguard and so much a day for each soldier on guard.²⁹

An extraordinary method of collecting contributions appeared during the War of the Austrian Succession when Marshal Saxe, after his victory at Fontenoy in 1745, took up winter quarters in western Flanders. The Allies, whose quarters were not far away, sent secret emissaries into the towns occupied by French garrisons demanding contributions from the mayors. When this practice had been stopped by the French, these demands began to arrive by the regular mail accompanied by the threat of military execution. Consternation was naturally caused by this and the French were obliged to open all the letters and abstract these communications.³⁰

An eighteenth century historian of Alsace describes the arrival of an invading army.³¹ The bells of the towns clanged a wild alarm as frantic peasants drove their flocks and herds deep into the forests. Lines of creaking carts laden with household goods, drawn by tired-eyed oxen, followed in a great cloud of dust the roads to the walled towns. Merchants and farmers hurried in the direction of the invading army hoping to purchase safeguards before their goods were pillaged. Mounting rapidly the slopes of the Rhine valley, through wheat and vine, galloped troops of approaching horsemen, brandishing sabers curved like Turkish scimitars. Cloaks streamed from their shoulders cut from the hides of wild beasts.

Evil was the day for poor Alsace! The Hungarian hussars had come to take their dreadful contributions—*mise à sac, à feu, et à sang de la ville et de son territoire*.

²⁸ Saint-Simon, *op. cit.*, XV, 177-183, 609.

²⁹ Saint-Simon, II, 506, 307; Irénée Lamière, *op. cit.*, 281; Henry Pichat, *La campagne du Maréchal de Saxe dans les Flandres: publié sous la direction de la section historique de l'état-major de l'armée* (Paris, 1909), 385-88.

³⁰ The details of these curious proceedings are found in Pichat, *op. cit.*, 256-259.

³¹ Louis Laguille, *Histoire de la province d'Alsace* (Strasbourg, 1727), 334.

BATTLE ON THE VISTULA

The Soviet-Polish Campaign of 1920

By Clarence A. Manning

THE WORLD WAR was primarily a war of position. For nearly four years the armies of the Allied and Central Powers fought in long and complex series of trenches manned by millions of men and supplied with enormous quantities of artillery and materiel. The lines extended for hundreds of miles across Europe on both the Western and Eastern fronts. The adjacent terrain was carefully studied and maps provided for the concentration of artillery fire on all important points. Under these circumstances many military men came to think of modern warfare and especially of the defensive in terms of trenches and salients, of local attacks and penetrations, of limited objectives and barrages. It seemed inconceivable that a war could be fought in the twentieth century without these adjuncts. Yet in the first important conflict that followed the Armistice, the Soviet-Polish struggle, the tactics were strikingly different. This was fundamentally a war of movement, where both sides covered enormous distance on foot and where in the course of a few months the battle line shifted for hundreds of miles.

This apparent return to older conditions startled even the commanders of the opposing forces. After the experiences of the World War, they seemed unable to visualize the problems which they had to face. Although movement had predominated during the period from 1918 to 1920, yet with the relatively large-scale warfare of the summer campaign of 1920, there appeared a startling tendency to revert to World War tactics. Perhaps his conceptions of these had much to do with the failure of the policy of Marshal Tukhachevsky, the Soviet commander. The same conceptions almost ruined Poland, for they forced the retreat of the Polish troops to the very outskirts of Warsaw. Then in a brilliant counterblow, Marshal Pilsudski changed his methods and at the battle of Warsaw or the battle on the Vistula, as the Poles prefer to call it, he practically destroyed the Soviet forces and in a few weeks recovered almost all the territory that had been lost in the preceding months.

The World War had opened with the mobilization of the trained reserves of both the Allied and the Central Powers. The Polish-Soviet contest commenced with the hastily gathered forces of two disorganized or unorganized states. Immediately after the German collapse, the Polish leaders gathered together small bands of poorly equipped men to seize the territory which they considered to be rightfully theirs. For months there was scarcely a definite unit larger than a battalion.¹ Unity of command hardly existed even on paper in a war on several fronts.

¹ A. Przybylski, *Wojna Polska, 1918-1921* (Warsaw, 1930), p. 30.

The situation was little better on the Soviet side. The figures of Tukhachevsky at the end of May, 1920 show his forces as 104,075,² and yet he speaks of enrolling in these forces approximately 40,000 deserters from previous Soviet forces.³ He seems to have believed that these men could be brought back to military effectiveness and given an excellent morale.

The chaos of 1918 and 1919 gradually gave way to some sort of order and during the main conflict there were in the field two real armies which numbered about 200,000 men. In the decisive battle in the Warsaw area, the Soviets had a superiority of some 10,000 or 20,000 men.

The supply service on both sides was almost non-existent. Roads were poor. Motor transportation was negligible. Railroads extended as far as the lines of German occupation to the east with a standard gauge. In Soviet territory the wider Russian gauge was used and the rolling stock was not interchangeable. As a result both sides were forced to live on the resources of the country and to cover ground by forced marches. The vast majority of the soldiers were hardy peasants and the troops stood the marches well.


The terrain also was suited for manoeuvre. Eastern Poland lies on the European plain, sloping down gradually to the Vistula River which is one of the larger rivers of Europe, approximately six hundred yards wide near Warsaw. The only important obstacles were the Pripet Marshes which covered a triangular area with the base on the Dnyeper River and the apex nearly two hundred miles to the west near the city of Brest Litovsk. These marshes are almost impassable for large numbers of troops, and hence they covered the flanks of both the northern and southern sections of the two armies. As the tide of battle moved westward, however, they became less and less important strategically.

The Soviet troops north and south of the Marshes were not united. Marshal Tukhachevsky commanded the area from the Marshes north to the Lithuanian border, and Yegorov with Stalin as political commissar was in charge south of the Marshes. It was apparently the intention of Kamenev, the Soviet commander-in-chief, to combine the forces under one command, as soon as the Marshes had been passed, but this was never done and the northern and southern forces had little liaison or cooperation. The main attack on Warsaw, the capital of Poland, was launched by the northern troops.

On the Polish side, Marshal Pilsudski as Chief of State was the supreme commander-in-chief; but at the beginning of the campaign he was preoccupied with the southern front, for this covered Eastern Galicia with its oilfields and the important city of Lwów and this province had not yet been formally awarded to Poland by the Great Powers, although it was in Polish possession. With the aid of the forces of Petlura, the Poles in May, 1920, had pushed into the Ukraine and had seized the city of Kiev and a bridge-head across the Dnyeper. Their triumph was very brief. A Soviet army of Yegorov together with the Cavalry Army of

² M. Tukhachevsky, *Pochód za Wisłą*, Polish Trans. A. Boguslawski (Warsaw, 1930), p. 279.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 280.



Budenny forced a retreat and invaded Eastern Galicia. For a while it seemed as if these areas would pass into Soviet hands but Piłsudski, with the assistance of Edward Śmigły-Rydź, the present Marshal of Poland, was able to slow up this drive and to secure Polish positions in the province.

Such was the situation when Tukhachevsky launched his main attack on July 4 and forced the retreat of the Polish forces to the area of Warsaw. It is very difficult to describe the plans of the Soviet commander. In his account of the campaign, he speaks throughout in World War terms. His plan was apparently to penetrate the Polish line near the centre and to throw it back on the Marshes, where the men would be hopelessly entangled.⁴ For this reason, he supplied the 15th Army, his centre unit, with the maximum of artillery. He also detached various units from the 4th Army and the III Cavalry Corps which formed his right wing to strengthen the centre, and as late as July 28, he detached from the III Cavalry Corps, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment to add to the 15th Army.⁵ Before this he had sought to take from his right wing the 15th Cavalry Division for the same purpose, but the order was disregarded.⁶ At no time in the attack did he succeed in penetrating the Polish lines and undoubtedly the weakening of his right flank facilitated the retreat of the Poles.

On the very first day of the attack, July 4, the III Cavalry Corps (composed of Caucasian troops) and the 4th Army turned the Polish left. The Soviet right was protected by the boundaries of the neutral or sympathetic countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and East Prussia, so that they could not be outflanked, and once they had come between the Polish left and the frontiers, they were in a position to force the Polish retirement to the southwest. In quick succession, they captured Wilno, the old trench line of the Eastern front, the line of the Bug River and by August 8 they were approaching Warsaw and the Vistula River.

This river flows northwestward across Poland to the Baltic Sea and empties into it at Danzig. Warsaw is located on a hill about two hundred feet high on the west bank of the river just above a rather sharp bend to the west. The steepness of the slope of this hill and the width of the river form considerable military obstacles and in previous conflicts, the Russians have usually crossed the Vistula above or below the city and delivered their main attack from the west. Tukhachevsky seems to have planned the same mode of advance.

The rapid advance of the Soviet Army and the poor conditions of transportation led to a certain disorganization and Tukhachevsky would have preferred to halt on the Bug to reorganize his forces but Kamenev, the Commander-in-Chief, and Trotsky as War Commissar urged him to press on in the hope that a Communist revolt would break out in Warsaw itself.

The morale of the Polish army fell tremendously during the retreat and there was much defeatism in the capital. The army leaders and the more reliable ele-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

⁵ G. D. Gay, *Na Varshavu, deystviya z konnogo korpusa na zapadnom fronte* (Moscow, 1928), p. 58.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

ments of the population realized that it was necessary to save Warsaw at all costs but they too feared an uprising of the radical classes. Some of the divisions in the south, on the contrary, had either never lost their morale or had regained it after checking the cavalry forces of Budenny near Brody.⁷ It must be emphasized, however, that in his advance Tukhachevsky did not pierce the Polish line but compelled the entire sector north of the Marshes to swing to the southwest, and naturally the troops nearer the Marshes retreated far more slowly and deliberately than did those on the northern end of the line. Furthermore the very character of the advance separated Tukhachevsky more and more from the forces of Yegorov, but he made no effort to strengthen his left flank which was becoming more exposed as he advanced.

Pilsudski realized very soon that the theories of warfare of the Polish commanders were in part responsible for the retreat. Up to July 4, 1920, mobile tactics had been preferred. Now against the formidable Soviet attack, the generals thought only of digging in and creating a line of defence. They had neither the men nor the guns to do this on the scale required. Pilsudski in his account laughs at the sketches and the maps which were made at this time. Thus General Szeptycki, the northern commander, ordered the preparation of a fortified zone some fifty kilometers in depth along his entire front, when he had at his disposal about 50,000 men, 100 light guns and 45 medium guns to cover nearly 300 miles.⁸

The plans for the artillery were even more fantastic. They were drawn with all the detail of the World War but there were neither guns nor munitions. Thus the 7th Battery of the 1st Regiment of the III Lithuanian-White Russian Division, was ordered to deliver a heavy bombardment of the enemy before an attack. It was to fire at the enemy at the rate of three shells a minute for two minutes. In case of an enemy attack, the battery was to fire 24 rounds to render a front of some 9 kilometers untenable by the enemy.⁹ It is easy to see that under such conditions the Poles could not hope to hold an entrenched line. Even the labor expended upon the construction of one was wasted.

In the face of the Soviet advance, the Poles became discouraged and appealed to the Allies for assistance. An Anglo-French Military Mission under General Weygand was sent to Poland and arrived in Warsaw at the end of July. It at once set to work to study the situation and to arrange for the transfer of needed supplies. This was a difficult task. At Danzig the workers on the docks refused to handle military materiel. The Czechoslovak government refused to allow supplies to be sent across its territory, a fact which the Poles have never forgotten and which they emphasized during the Munich crisis. However in one way or another, supplies were received, some of them from the Allied dumps in the Balkans. On August 2, Pilsudski returned to Warsaw to consult with the commission. The conferences were not harmonious, although both Weygand and Pilsudski recognized the necessity of saving the capital.

⁷ J. Pilsudski, *Rok 1920* (Warsaw, 1931), p. 159.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 110.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 111.



Red transport in Poland, 1920. From the drawing of S. Norblin, an eye witness, in the Illustrated London News.

General Weygand believed that the Soviet troops would not make a direct attack upon Warsaw from the east. He considered that the perceptible northward movement of Tukhachevsky's left indicated that the Soviet commander planned to cross the river below Warsaw and to attack from the west. He therefore planned to concentrate all available men and guns around the capital and to carry on a position defence. In this he proposed to use such artillery as he had along the same lines as in the World War, for despite the Polish artillery shortage, the Soviet army was even less well equipped. Neither side was in a position to use airplanes on any extensive scale. He also planned to evacuate Eastern Galicia, including the city of Lwów, which had still not been formally assigned to Poland by the Council of Ambassadors. He advised the Poles to retire behind the Vistula and the San, a tributary of the Vistula from the southwest. Then he intended to reorganize the troops and deliver a counterattack on the Soviet troops with the main effort on his left below Warsaw.

This plan did not appeal to Marshal Piłsudski. He agreed with Weygand as to the defence of Warsaw, but he believed that Tukhachevsky would attack directly or above the city. In this he was absolutely wrong, but his mistake was very fortunate for the Poles, for it favored them in his plan for a successful counterattack. He believed also that it would be disastrous to evacuate Eastern Galicia because of its oilfields and its contact with Rumania. He felt that if Poland once voluntarily gave up this area, it would be very difficult to recover it and he determined to use all of his power as Chief of State to prevent it. He was the more convinced of the propriety of his decision, by the fact that the Polish line in the south was holding well against Yegorov and Budenny.

Pilsudski's plan of action was very different from that of Weygand and very dangerous, if the two Soviet forces cooperated. It was to take the River Wieprz, an eastern tributary of the Vistula, as a line of departure and then to advance north against the Soviet lines of communication in an endeavor to roll up the left wing of Tukhachevsky's forces. He planned to secure the troops for this manoeuvre by withdrawing from the line some of the better divisions already engaged and by moving some from the front opposed to Yegorov. Despite all opposition he issued his orders for this plan on August 6.¹⁰ In this he visualized an attack by five and one half divisions from the Wieprz, while the bulk of the force around Warsaw, 15 divisions, would have a more passive role.¹¹ However, the orders were somewhat changed so that the 5th Polish Army north of Warsaw made an assault along the River Wkra in an endeavor to relieve pressure on the Warsaw bridgehead.¹²

Pilsudski placed in direct charge of the force on the Wieprz his most trusted officer, Edward Smigly-Rydź, the present Marshal of Poland. He left the defence of Warsaw to Weygand and the Polish officer in command there, General Josef Haller, who had served with the Polish Legions in France. In general the commanders in this sector seem to have been men of whom Pilsudski was not particularly fond.

Weygand was right in his estimate of Tukhachevsky's plans. The Soviet Army advanced to the northwest and by the time of the battle, the extreme left was only 50 kilometers above the city along the Vistula and the right formed by the III Cavalry Corps and the 4th Army was far to the northwest of the capital. The special mission of this force was to cut the line of the Vistula near Toruń and to sever all communications between Warsaw and Danzig. The bulk of the Soviet troops were moving into positions to attack Warsaw from the northeast and north.

At the same time Tukhachevsky, whether from indifference or overconfidence, did not strengthen the Mozyr Group which had guarded his left flank while it was covered by the Marshes. He was becoming more and more separated from Yegorov and Budenny, but at the same time they made no move to support him. Expected orders to establish a unified command were not received from Kamenev, and the failure of orders to bear both the signature of the military commander and the civilian commissar served to break down the last chances of cooperation. In his tables for July 4, Tukhachevsky gives the strength of the Mozyr Group as 13,438, including the 57th Division.¹³ In the tables of the forces at the Bug about August 7, he gives it only 4193 bayonets.¹⁴ It is therefore safe to estimate that a force of not over 8,000 men with almost no artillery was holding a vital sector of the front covering at least 50 kilometers. Its contacts with the southern

¹⁰ Przybylski, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹² L. Sikorski, *La campagne polonoise-russe de 1920* (Paris, 1928), p. 285.

¹³ Tukhachevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

forces were negligible and its liaison with Tukhachevsky was neglected.

There is a still more surprising fact. When Pilsudski prepared his plan of August 6, and even when he commenced his attack on the 16th he had no information of the troops who were to be attacked by the Polish force.¹⁵ During the entire retreat which had lasted since July 4, the Polish intelligence service had failed utterly to secure information about this important sector. It seems almost incredible, but we have Pilsudski's own statement to that effect.

The plan of Pilsudski would have been hazardous, had the Soviet forces been alert and cooperating. In fact neither Tukhachevsky nor Yegorov paid attention to it, and even when a copy of the order of August 6 was found upon a dead Polish officer, not one of the responsible commanders believed that it was a real indication of the Polish movements. They simply disregarded the supposed plan.¹⁶

On August 12, before the Soviet attack on Warsaw began, Pilsudski with a small staff left the capital for Pulawy to prepare the attack which he had set for August 17. He planned to use the intervening days in reviewing and encouraging the troops and in making the necessary plans for the actual attack. During this period the troops were almost isolated from the rest of the front and were given an opportunity to rest.

The Soviet attack on Warsaw commenced on August 13 and continued without pause for three days. At the same time the 5th Polish Army along the Wkra River attempted to push north and to turn the semicircle around the city into an ellipse. Progress in that sector was very slow and costly. Further south the Soviet 16th Army captured the town of Radzymin on the first day of the battle. This loss was more serious from a moral than a military viewpoint, because it caused the Poles to commit a large part of their reserves at the very beginning of the struggle. Finally on August 15, the Poles recovered the town and restored their lines.

General Weygand directed the defence of the city. He had time to introduce definite position warfare. The Poles were well entrenched. Their artillery was accurately placed and well handled. In their positions around the city and the suburb of Praga on the east bank of the river, they were protecting a definite and relatively short line which they could man and arm effectively. Artillery played an important part and during the battle, the Poles had a definite superiority in this arm. In short the Soviets were attacking a stone wall. Further to the west below the city the same general conditions prevailed, and the commanders around Warsaw definitely felt that this defence checked the Soviet advance.

The successful defence of the city raised the morale of the Polish troops, but it did not encourage the whole of the civilian population. There were constant rumors of an approaching uprising within the city, as Tukhachevsky hoped. In addition to this, the Poles kept intercepting messages from the Soviet Commander to his 4th Army to cross the Vistula, surround the city and attack Warsaw from

¹⁵ Pilsudski, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

¹⁶ Tukhachevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

the west. Despite these messages, the Poles could obtain no information about the Soviet right, except that it was advancing toward the Lower Vistula. An appeal was made to Pilsudski to advance his counterattack and he finally yielded and commenced this on August 16, one day before the scheduled time.

On the morning of the 16th, the Soviet attack on Warsaw seemed to diminish in violence. The troops under Smigly-Rydź advanced from the Wieprz. Before many hours had passed, the 21st Polish Division in a sharp encounter routed the 57th Soviet Division, the only force identified in the Mozyr Group. Outside of this, there was little contact between forces. The Polish forces advanced about 30 kilometers without definitely locating the enemy. That night the situation appeared to Pilsudski to be highly fantastic, because he could not believe that the Mozyr Group was practically non-existent and that he had no enemy in front of him.

On the 17th, the advance continued and it became evident that the former situation had entirely changed. It will be remembered that the army of Pilsudski was advancing north and that the left wing of the Soviet forces was endeavoring to push west. Pilsudski was therefore placing himself well in the rear across the Soviet lines of communication, but these were not choked with traffic as in the World War. The armies were both living off the country and their trains were reduced to a minimum. Yet even so, it is remarkable that the commander of the 16th Soviet Army did not notify Tukhachevsky of the attack until the 18th, the third day of the Polish advance. The Mozyr Group which was completely scattered made no report at all.¹⁷ It was then too late to attempt any counter measures. Thus again all reports of the enemy were ignored by the Soviet commanders and the service of liaison and communication failed utterly.¹⁸

The 16th Army started the retreat which soon became a rout, as it spread from the left to the right of the Soviet forces. The 16th Army was nearly destroyed as it tried to cut its way through the Polish lines to the east. A few units and detachments of the 3rd and 15th Armies were able to get through in formation, largely owing to confusion in the Polish plans and to a failure to secure and to evaluate information promptly. There were even cases where small hostile units marched on almost parallel roads without apparently noticing each other. The 4th Army on the Soviet right still continued its western march and on the 19th, forced the Vistula near Plock, 100 kilometers below Warsaw.

The battle was over and on August 19, the same day that Tukhachevsky learned of the counterattack, Pilsudski returned to Warsaw to organize the pursuit. There was some difficulty in the north, because it was still necessary to detach forces to observe and check the 4th Soviet army, but the errors and confusion were of minor importance. The pursuit lasted until August 25. By that time the Poles were holding much the same positions as they had a month earlier, but their spirit was entirely different. Advancing eastward from Warsaw and north-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

¹⁸ "In the attack on Grodno communications between units of the army did not exist." Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 111.



*Piłsudski, Marshal of Poland. A drawing by
Zdzisław Czermański, courtesy of the Polish Em-
bassy, Washington, D. C.*

ward from the Wieprz, they were dealing blow after blow to a demoralized army which did not know where to turn. Those Soviet troops that did not surrender fled northward and took refuge in East Prussia. It is very doubtful if more than 10,000 men with arms in their hands succeeded in fighting their way through the Polish lines to join the Soviet army along its own frontiers.

In the meanwhile the 4th Soviet Army and the III Cavalry Corps continued westward and did not commence to retreat until the 21st, when all hope of escape was gone. The explanation for the mysterious action of these troops was very simple. On August 15, a small Polish unit made a raid on Ciechanów and forced the Soviet troops out of the city. As the Soviet staff withdrew, it destroyed the army radio and burned all of its documents. Thus the 4th Army and the III Cavalry Corps were completely out of contact with the 15th Army on its left or with the Commander-in-Chief. No one seemed to consider this remarkable and apparently no efforts were made to reestablish contact, even though the Soviet cavalry were in command of the situation. Acting upon their original instruction, Gay and Sergeyev the leaders of the 4th Army continued to advance, until it was all over. When the news of the defeat finally reached them, there was nothing for them to do but to take refuge in East Prussia.

The menace to Warsaw was ended with startling suddenness, and in the next six weeks the Poles pressed their advantage. Save for the two areas of Minsk and Wilno, they reoccupied almost all the territory which they had been forced to evacuate in July. By the middle of October, the Soviets accepted peace terms at Riga, and on October 18 an armistice put an end to hostilities with the Poles holding the territory which they had recaptured. A few days later General Zeligowski resigned from the Polish Army and with some private followers seized the city of Wilno from the Lithuanians to whom the Soviet had handed it. Zeligowski turned the city over to Poland and the cession was later ratified by the Council of Ambassadors.

There has been a prolonged controversy over the respective roles of Weygand and Piłsudski in the campaign and this controversy has played an important part in the relations between France and Poland since the War. To Weygand must be given the credit for organizing the defences of Warsaw and for inspiring the defensive actions east and north of the city. It is very doubtful if there was any officer in the Polish Army with the necessary knowledge and skill to carry on the defence of the capital with all the problems of supply involved. It was a case where the lessons of the World War, even if on a small scale, could be applied directly. Weygand did it with the aid of the officers in those sectors. And it is among them that we find the greatest enthusiasm for the arguments that it was the northern defence and the offensive along the Wkra that really caused the victory.

Yet it is very doubtful whether any defence along the Vistula with a later attack from the Vistula and the San could have inflicted such a decisive and sudden defeat upon the Soviet forces as did the attack from the Wieprz. Cutting directly

across the lines of communications behind the Soviet left flank, Pilsudski bottled up one wing of his opponents, and with one blow he cleared central Poland of the enemy, saved Eastern Galicia for Poland, and in a spectacular manner eliminated the Soviet menace. The idea of the northward attack was apparently his own and he insisted upon this plan against the advice of General Weygand and many of his own advisers. Dangerous it was, but Pilsudski knew the character of his opponents and he felt that this "Napoleonic manoeuvre" had a good chance of success. It succeeded far beyond his calculations.

The most astonishing feature of the whole campaign is the surprising neglect of reconnaissance and liaison. The reports of both sides indicate that the commanders paid little attention to the maintenance of these services. Communications between front and rear and between adjacent units were neglected. The most striking aspect of this was probably the virtual isolation of the 4th Soviet Army by the loss of its radio at a decisive moment and the complete lack of interest manifested by the army commander, by Tukhachevsky, and the commander of the 15th Soviet Army.

These mistakes were due to the fundamental confusion in the minds of the leaders as to position and mobile warfare. The generals remembered that in the World War the units were closely crowded together. Here they were often separated by miles from a neighboring unit, and the problem of liaison took a very different form. It is to the credit of Pilsudski that he was the first to recognize this and gave up the idea of constructing elaborate fortifications which the enemy could easily avoid. He realized also that in the open plains, the guerilla methods of 1919 had brought victory, whereas the attempt to apply World War tactics and position warfare was leading the Poles to defeat. His studies of the campaigns of Napoleon had given him an idea of warfare of movement, and it was with this background that he planned the blow that really ended the War. He realized that he could not afford to tie up his men and material in useless strong points and trench systems.

The Treaty of Riga ended the war and brought to eastern Europe a decade of relative peace. It insured a peaceful development of Poland and it blocked, during the formative period of the new states, the western advance of the Soviet system. When we remember the conditions that prevailed in this area immediately after the armistice, we can estimate the moral results of a Soviet victory at Warsaw. Viscount D'Abernon aptly called it "the eighteenth decisive battle of the world."

EQUIPMENT FOR THE MILITIA OF THE MIDDLE STATES, 1775-1781

By Hugh Jameson

MUCH has been written concerning the unprepared condition of the American colonies in 1775 and the dearth of military equipment of every kind during the early years of the war, but most of the writers have considered the subject in terms of its effects on the Continental army.¹ Little has been done with the problem as it bore directly on the effectiveness of the militia.² The Continental army was a permanently embodied force raised by the united efforts of the states, and nominally under the control of the Continental Congress. It was not blessed with an abundance of equipment at any time during the war, but as Van Tyne has shown, the work of Beaumarchais and Silas Deane kept it in the field during the critical year of 1777, and thereafter it was tolerably well armed and reasonably well equipped. The militia was the local defensive force of each individual state, theoretically composed of the entire adult male population. It was not a permanently embodied force, but rather one which, in theory at least, could be mobilized rapidly in any emergency and disbanded quickly when the danger was past.

At the outset the revolutionary government had no intention of using the militia for any purpose other than purely local defence, but circumstances shortly forced them to change their plans, if not their ideas, as to the type of service for which militia might be properly called.³ The initial refusal of Congress to recruit a standing army, or to authorize long term enlistments, and the subsequent failure of the states to raise their quotas for the Continental army made it necessary to call increasing numbers of militia into active service to augment the army which never attained its authorized strength. Militia were the poorest and most unwilling of troops, but they did serve throughout the war as replacements in the Continental lines of their respective states and as militia units attached to the army

¹ Among the foremost studies are: L. C. Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army*; O. W. Stephenson, *The Supplies for the American Revolutionary Army*, (MSS thesis Univ. of Mich. Library); O. W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776" *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXX, 271; C. H. Van Tyne, *The War of Independence*; E. Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States*.

² A beginning has been made by Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (Boston, 1934).

³ One of the best illustrations of the prevailing ideas of militia service in 1775-1776 is found in the reply which Washington received from the Committee of Safety of New York, April 25, 1776. Washington wanted to know how long it would take to embody 2,500 or 3,000 New York militia and what plans had been made to collect them in a hurry. *Writings*, (Ford ed.) IV, 33. The Committee replied that they had no idea how long it would take, and that since they foresaw no such emergency they had not considered any method of mobilization. *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 420.

on a temporary basis. In their various localities they were called repeatedly to render services which ranged from turning out on any sudden alarm, to guarding prisoners, apprehending deserters, building fortifications, and protecting cattle. They contributed much to the many failures of the period and shared in the successes. In whatever capacity they served, however, they retained their identity as militia and they emerged in 1781 as destitute of arms and equipment as they were in 1775; a condition which this paper attempts to account for.⁴

In 1775 every adult male in the colonies, excepting only the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, was supposed to have in his possession a full complement of arms and equipment. Colonial militia laws were precise and detailed on this subject. Every man was expected to furnish himself with a musket, flints, knapsack, powder, and shot. Periodic inspection of these articles was prescribed and penalties imposed for delinquency with respect to any and all of them.⁵ Despite the laws, however, few men possessed the requisite equipment for the very simple reason that the laws had been indifferently observed, or altogether ignored. They remained on the statute books but it was common practice, throughout the colonial period, to permit them to pass into abeyance between wars; which practice had been faithfully observed after 1763.⁶ The situation as it was on the eve of the war is perhaps best seen in the replies of the colonial governors to Lord Dartmouth's questionnaire of 1773.

As Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Dartmouth attempted a survey of the state of the colonies. To this end the governors were questioned for information on a great variety of subjects, among them the number of militia and the general state of colonial defence. Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire said, in his reply, that the regulations as to arms and equipment were so little observed that he was sure there was not four ounces of powder per man, or one musket to every four men and, he feared, "still less of the other requisites." The governor of Massachusetts did not know either the number of the militia, or the condition of their equipment, because many of the regiments had been without officers for years and there were no returns upon which to base even an estimate. The replies of other governors were in similar vein. They were forced either to plead ignorance as to the state of the militia, or to state frankly that the laws were openly disobeyed.⁷ On the whole it was a most distressing picture but the accuracy of it was amply attested by the development of 1775.

The middle colonies were slow in catching the military fever in 1775. There was little in the way of preparation for armed resistance prior to Lexington, and

⁴ In one sense, perhaps, militia lost their identity as such while serving as replacements in the army, but they were recruited from the militia for that special service. They retained all the characteristics of militia during their brief term of service and returned to the militia when their tour of duty was done.

⁵ For examples of colonial militia laws see: *Arch. of Md.*, I, 77; W. Hening, *Statutes at Large of Va.*, I, 528.

⁶ H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies During the Eighteenth Century*, I, 500.

⁷ The Dartmouth Papers containing the questions and answers are in manuscript form in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.

that little was entirely local and unsystematic.⁸ Except in Maryland where a provincial congress adopted a few half-hearted resolutions it was neither authorized, nor sanctioned by the most radical of revolutionary leaders.⁹ Immediately after Lexington, however, a vast volunteer militia began to form under the guidance of local committees and when this happened the lack of military accessories of every kind became abundantly evident. Petitions urgently requesting guns, powder and lead, poured in upon the committees and conventions from every quarter. Some localities had a few muskets but no powder, some had powder but no flints, some could boast small amounts of everything, but none, apparently, had a sufficient store of any essential item.¹⁰ The local committees could do nothing but make recommendations which had the effect of throwing the problem back on the volunteers, but the provincial congresses and conventions, when they assembled some weeks after Lexington, incorporated the volunteers as part of the militia and took steps to arm and equip them.

In the matter of military equipment, as in all things pertaining to militia, the provisional governments of 1775 followed the practices and traditions of the colonial period, requiring the militia, first by recommendation and later by law, to purchase their own arms and accoutrements.¹¹ Additional measures were passed, however, to provide a supply of public arms which could be loaned to the militia if and when they should be called into active service. The Convention of Maryland authorized the Council of Safety "to contract for, purchase, and provide 5,000 stand of arms," to remain the property of the province available for the use of the militia in time of need.¹² A commission was appointed in New Jersey to provide 3,000 stand of arms, and the Pennsylvania Council of Safety urged the county authorities to procure immediately "a proper number of good new firelocks, with bayonets fitted to them, cartridge boxes with twenty-three rounds in every box and knapsacks," a "proper number" being 4,500.¹³ Under directions from the Provincial Congress the City Committee of New York ordered the arms belonging to the city to be equipped with steel ramrods and announced that it was prepared to purchase arms from any person who had them to sell.¹⁴

It was undoubtedly the intention of the various revolutionary governments, in

⁸ A. C. Flick, *Loyalism in New York*, p. 23; W. C. Abbott, *New York in the American Revolution*, Ch. V; *Minutes of the Provincial Congress and Committee of Safety of New Jersey*, 1774-1776, pp. 1-19; C. H. Lincoln, *The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania*, pp. 40-52.

⁹ *Proceedings of the Conventions of Maryland*, 1774-1775, p. 8.

¹⁰ *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.*, 1774-1776, p. 165; *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 527, II, 286, 313; *Arch. of Md.*, XII, 80, *passim*; *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 114; *Col. Rec. of Pa.*, X, 322; *Statutes at Large of Pa.*, IX 529, 557; *Force, Am. Arch.*, (4th ser.), II, 469, 485, 516, 542, 548.

¹¹ *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 114; *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.*, 1775-1776, p. 239; *Statutes at Large of Pa.*, VIII, 502-528.

¹² *Arch. of Md.*, XI, 30.

¹³ *Statutes at Large of Pa.*, VIII, 488.

¹⁴ *Force, Am. Arch.*, (4th ser.), II, 530, 531.



The Continental line was not blessed with an abundance of equipment. Drawing by Count J. Onfroy de Breville ("Job") in Frederick T. Hill, *Washington, Man of Action*.

the early summer of 1775, to use whatever military supplies their measures produced to arm and equip their militia, and there is nothing in the record of their proceedings to indicate that they contemplated any diversion to other purposes. Unfortunately for their intentions, however, very little of the equipment ever found its way into the hands of the militia, and that little did not remain long, because the appearance of new and more urgent problems shortly forced a change in their plans.

On May 25, 1775, Congress asked New York to raise 3,000 men to garrison the fortifications at Kings Bridge and other places along the Hudson.¹⁵ In June, Congress requested six companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania, and two from Maryland.¹⁶ In October, New Jersey was asked to raise two battalions and Pennsylvania one battalion for the army.¹⁷ Congress agreed to assume the cost of arming and equipping such troops, but asked the several governments to find the necessary articles and place them in their hands.¹⁸ In view of the scarcity this was a real problem and one which increased in difficulty as Congress called for an ever increasing number of troops.

There was no certainty in 1775 that the militia of the middle states would ever be called for active service. It was in fact generally hoped that they would not be.¹⁹ It was, however, imperative that troops raised for immediate field service be armed as speedily as possible, and the available supplies were consequently diverted to that end. By September 2, the Provincial Congress of New York had collected 4,500 pounds of powder and an order was issued for its distribution to the militia, but before the order could be executed it was cancelled and the powder was sent to General Schuyler.²⁰ On December 30, the Pennsylvania militia were ordered to return all the firearms belonging to the province, that they might be employed in arming the boats for the defense of the Delaware.²¹ The Maryland Council of Safety, March 6, 1776, ordered the militia officers to deliver all the arms, then in the hands of their companies, to Continental officers, because the public service required the arming of the regular troops.²² By March 13, it was reported on good authority that the arming of two battalions for the Continental service had drained New Jersey of its best arms.²³ Measures of this sort soon took most of the "public arms" out of the hands of the militia, but the needs of the army were yet so great that those privates who owned arms were urged to sell them to agents appointed for that purpose, which also depleted the privately owned stock.²⁴

¹⁵ *Jour. of the Cont. Cong.*, II, 59-60.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 285, 291.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 442, IV, 415.

¹⁹ The issues were not clearly drawn. War-like preparations were mixed with peaceful petitions, a long war was not contemplated and Independence was not seriously thought of.

²⁰ *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 135, 168.

²¹ *Arch. of Pa.* IV, 694.

²² *Arch. of Md.*, XI, 203.

²³ Duer, *Life of Sterling*, p. 140; *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.*, 1774-1776, p. 341.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 342; *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, II, 309-310.

On March 14, 1776, Congress adopted a resolution, calling upon the states to disarm the loyalists and recommending that the confiscated arms be applied, in the first place to arming the Continental troops, in the next place to arming such provincial troops as each state might raise for its own defense, and the residue to the militia.²⁵ This resolution, adopted in substance by all of the provisional governments, is perhaps the best statement of the policy pursued during the rest of the war.²⁶ The wisdom of it is scarcely open to question. In the light of existing conditions it was much wiser to arm the troops in the field than to leave arms in the hands of a civilian militia who might or might not be called upon to use them, but the fact remains that there was very little "residue" for the militia.

Occasionally thereafter, small dribbles of powder and shot were issued to "well affected militia" with the admonition that they were "not to depend on any further supplies at the public expense,"²⁷ but for the most part their repeated appeals were answered by regretful refusals on the ground that there were not enough arms to supply the regular troops.²⁸ The militia were thus left very largely to secure their own military effects by purchase in the midst of an appalling shortage.

The policy of requiring the militia to purchase their own equipment was a failure from first to last. For one thing, the cost of a complete outfit was prohibitive in a great many cases. The list of articles necessary to equip a militia man, as specified by Congress, included ten separate items.²⁹ It has not been but "a good musket with a bayonet attached thereto" was undoubtedly the most expensive single item. In the summer of 1775, a reasonably good musket could be had for four pounds ten shillings.³⁰ By the end of the year, however, the shortage had forced the price up. The Provincial Congress of New Jersey was forced to remove the price limit in February, 1776, and contract for firearms "upon the best terms in their power without any limitation, or restriction."³¹ In May, Mr. Stephen West, a gun broker in Maryland, was holding out for a price of six pounds, twelve shillings and six pence.³² By August 1777, gunsmiths

²⁵ *Jour. of the Cont. Cong.*, IV, 205.

²⁶ *Proc. of the Conv. of Md.*, p. 75; *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.* 1774-1776, p. 486; *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 528; *Statutes at Large of Pa.*, VIII, 560.

²⁷ *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 244.

²⁸ *Arch. of Md.*, XI, 276.

²⁹ "A good musket that will carry an ounce ball, with a bayonet, steel ramrod, worm, priming wire and brush, a cutting sword or tomahawk, a cartridge box to hold twenty-three rounds, twelve flints, and a knapsack. *Jour. of the Cont. Cong.*, II, 189.

possible to obtain accurate figures as to the prevailing prices of all of these articles,

³⁰ *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.*, 1774-1776, p. 247; *Arch. of Md.*, XI, 26; *Col. Rec of Pa.*, X, 711.

³¹ *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.*, 1774-1776, p. 358.

³² Mr. West's price is of interest since he submitted an itemized list of the materials and labor necessary to produce a musket, with the cost of each; *Arch. of Md.*, XI, 407-408.

Barrel	£ 1, 15
Loop for sling swivels	2
A screw and nut for the butt	1
Fixing loops and sights to barrel	3

in Philadelphia were demanding upwards of nine pounds, and a year later twenty rifles sold in Pennsylvania for thirty pounds each.³³ Cartridge boxes rose from nine to twelve shillings and knapsacks, flints, tomahawks, powder and shot advanced in proportion.³⁴ A complete outfit must, therefore, have demanded a cash outlay of from ten to fifteen pounds. There were many men who could not afford such an expenditure, and there were also many who could have purchased equipment but who were not sufficiently in sympathy with the cause to spend money for that purpose.³⁵ The prohibitive cost of arms and disaffection were not, however, the only causes of the failure.

The incomplete returns of the period indicate that considerable numbers of men possessed arms in 1775 and that others did purchase them during the first wave of enthusiasm following Lexington. But such arms were invariably regarded as private property. The owners were loath to take them into service where they might be lost or injured and they would seldom lend them even when promised compensation.³⁶ This reluctance increased as the war progressed because governments were ever quick to make promises but very slow in paying for lost or damaged arms.³⁷ The practice of hiding arms to avoid taking them into service became

A set of brass mountings which must be polished and filed	15
A stock	15
A lock	15
A rammer	5
Screw and pins for butt, guards, and loops	5
A spring for the rammer	1
Polishing the barrel	5
Two slings swivels and screws	5
A Bayonet scabbard hook and fixings	4 6
A good bayonet	12 6
To a workman putting all parts together, fixing lock, brasses, loops, swivel and fitting in the lock to the stock	5
A woolen case for gun including thread and making	2 6
<hr/>	
	£ 6, 12s, 6d

³³ *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 520, VI, 467.

³⁴ *Min. of the Prov. Cong. of N. J.*, 1774-1776, p. 247.

³⁵ The extent of disaffection was much greater than is frequently supposed. In such areas as Somerset, Sussex and Worcester Counties in Maryland, Bergen and Burlington, New Jersey, Lancaster and York in Pennsylvania and Kings, Queens, Richmond, Suffolk and Westchester, New York, there were so many tories as to render the militia organization relatively ineffective.

³⁶ *Arch. of Md.*, XII, 32, 56, 80, 106, 112, 143; *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 570.

³⁷ General Potter, commanding a detachment of Pennsylvania militia at Wilmington in 1777, was amazed at the unarmed condition of the men. After investigating the cause he reported as follows: "One reason why the militia came so ill armed is that they are afraid if they lose their arms in battle they will not be paid for, as proof of their fears they give an instance of the arms lost at Ft. Washington. There are great numbers who have arms but they will not bring them into the field." *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 570.

The Executive Council, September 4, 1777, promised that the state would pay for any privately owned equipment which was lost in battle, or captured. *Col. Rec. of Pa.*, XI, 291. In May 1778, however, the people were still complaining about arms which had been lost for over two years and for which no payment had been made. *Arch. of Pa.*, VI, 547-548. In Nov. 1779, no payment had been made, and Richard McCalister, a county lieutenant

so general during the final years of the war that it was made the subject of legislation imposing heavy penalties.³⁸ It does not appear from the records, however, that the laws served as any material check, most men would not purchase arms and powder and donate them to the public.³⁹

All hopes that the militia would be left at home for occasional local needs were abruptly ended June 3, 1776, when Congress called for 16,750 militia from the middle states to augment the army, and expressly requested that this number be armed and equipped by the states.⁴⁰ Obviously no adequate store of arms and equipment was in the possession of any of the state governments and no sufficient quantity was ever accumulated during the campaign. By July 19, the Maryland militia were flocking into Annapolis every day, "but many of them without arms, blankets, or any other necessities."⁴¹

The Militia of Ulster County, New York marched without ammunition because there was none to give them, and there was in general among all regiments an "abysmal lack of guns, cartridge boxes, and every other accoutrement of war."⁴² Everywhere it was the same story. By January 9, 1777, there were upwards of 2,200 militia in Philadelphia waiting for arms.⁴³ Companies and regiments were started for camp "half armed and totally devoid of blankets, tents, and camp utensils."⁴⁴ Some detachments were halted on the march because their arms were out of repair and unfit for service, but many were sent on with only a vague hope that they would find equipment some where on the march, or obtain it at camp when they arrived.⁴⁵ It is, in fact, impossible to discover a fully furnished militia regiment in the records of the campaign of 1776. Despite the distressing aspects of the picture, however, considerable numbers were armed and equipped in a manner, and the important fact to be noted is that the vast majority of these did not carry their own arms but drew their supplies from public stores furnished in part by their own governments and in part by the Continental Congress.⁴⁶

protested to the Council that the law was so poorly worded that no official had any responsibility in the matter. "It has soured the minds of many" he wrote, "the people tease me daily for their pay and I am at a loss what answer to give." *Arch. of Pa.*, VIII, 16. See also *Arch. of Md.*, XVI, 346-347, XLV, 403.

³⁸ *Arch. of Pa.*, VI, 547-548; *Laws of the State of Maryland*, 1781. Chap. X; *Journal and Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the State of New Jersey*, 1780. Chap. XXXI.

³⁹ It was generally futile to levy fines on militia, since there was very little prospect that they would be collected.

⁴⁰ *Jour. of the Cont. Cong.*, IV, 410-412.

⁴¹ *Arch. of Md.*, XII, 80, 190-191.

⁴² *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, II, 286, 304, 313.

⁴³ *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 178.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; *Arch. of Md.*, XII, 238, 246, 258; *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 527; *Col. Rec. of Pa.*, X, 665.

⁴⁵ *Arch. of Md.*, XII, 258; Washington, *Writings*, (Ford ed.), V, 119, *passim*.

⁴⁶ Urged repeatedly by the states and prodded by Washington, Congress did what it could. Twenty thousand dollars was appropriated to arm the militia intended for the Flying Camp. Some old arms belonging to Congress were sent to Pennsylvania, and the secret committee was directed to deliver arms to Maryland troops. *Journal*, V, 558, 566, 627, 706; Washington, *Writings*, (Ford ed.), IV, 244.

It was apparent from the beginning of the campaign that militia troops were exceedingly hard on equipment of all kinds. Being virtually without training they did not know how to use arms, or care for them, and they were notoriously careless as to the fate of public equipment, and even private property if it did not happen to belong to them. Moreover, many were not above stealing public arms and selling them. According to the universal testimony of the officers who tried to command them, they often left in a "scandalous manner without returning the ammunition and other public stores."⁴⁷ "Notwithstanding the most positive orders" they carried away the public arms "and in many cases exchanged them for an inferior sort."⁴⁸ Such arms as they did return were frequently found to be "exceedingly out of repair owing in many instances to the shameful neglect and abuse of the persons in whose hands they have been."⁴⁹ Washington complained bitterly to Congress of the great consumption and waste of arms by the militia. "Many of these," he said, "threw their arms away, some lost them, whilst others deserted and took them away."⁵⁰ Towards the end of the campaign he apprehended the "most fatal consequences" unless some check could be speedily applied to the general wastefulness and destructive propensities of the militia. "The mischief" he said "is not confined to desertion alone. They stay until they are properly equipped to render essential service, and by that means plunder the public of the necessities that were at first otherwise intended and would be better applied."⁵¹

The campaign of 1776 taught both Continental and state authorities that it was extremely unwise to arm militia until the moment they entered service, and thereafter, throughout the rest of the war, the most positive orders were given that arms and equipment were to be doled out at the last possible minute and collected immediately after the term of service expired.⁵² The idea that the militia could or would purchase their own arms and accoutrements was given over by Maryland and Pennsylvania. In those states the militia acts of 1777 provided that arms and equipment sufficient for two classes in each company should be provided at the expense of the state. Such arms were not to be issued to the militia but to remain in the custody of the county lieutenants who were to issue them only to militia going into active service.⁵³ The legislature of New Jersey continued in its militia regulation to give lip service to the principle of private

⁴⁷ George Clinton to the New York Convention, *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, I, 441.

⁴⁸ General McDougall to the New York Convention, *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 781.

⁴⁹ *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 558.

⁵⁰ Washington, *Writings*, (Ford ed.), V, 119.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁵² *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 720; *Arch. of Md.*, XXI 102, 105; *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, V, 333; *Arch. of Pa.*, IX, 365; Washington, *Writings*, (Ford ed.), VII, 190.

⁵³ *Laws of the State of Md.*, 1777, Chap. XVII, Sec. XVI; *Statutes at Large of Pa.*, IX, 84. According to statutes the militia were divided into eight classes, which classes were to take their tour of duty in rotation. Arms sufficient for two classes meant, therefore, arms for one fourth of the militia.

purchase, but at the same time made provision for a partial supply at public expense.⁶⁴ In New York the requirement was maintained under the theory, as Governor Clinton said, that "the militia must be induced, if possible, to provide the means of defence . . . for they waste with a lavish hand all of the supplies furnished them by the public."⁶⁵ But Clinton admitted on many occasions that it never worked.⁶⁶

The policy of issuing equipment only to that portion of the militia going into immediate service at the last minute and collecting it at the first possible moment when they were discharged may have saved some public supplies, but it did not materially improve the situation, because it could not stop the misuse and destruction of supplies while they remained in the hands of the militia during their tour of duty, and because the militia-man never developed the habit of waiting to be disarmed when his term of service expired.

The militia records for the years 1771-1781 are fragmentary and incomplete, but they present convincing evidence that the waste, destruction, and thievery of public equipment continued throughout the war.⁶⁷ On October 8, 1777, General Armstrong, who commanded the brigade of Pennsylvania militia then in service, wrote to the Executive Council:

I can give you but a faint idea of our many perplexities, among which is the villainous practice of theiving Guns, Gunlocks, and Ammunition, more especially on hasty and night movements which I could not have imagined the militia capable of.⁶⁸

Early in May, 1778, ammunition was released by the Board of War to General Roberdeau for distribution to the frontier militia. He issued it to them on the occasion of an alarm which proved to be abortive, but a few days later when the Indians did appear "there was scarcely a cartridge to be found among them."⁶⁹ In September 1779, President Reed complained to William Henry, city lieutenant of Philadelphia, that the state was continually under heavy expense for the repair of arms delivered to the militia. "Sometimes," he said, "being out only a few days they return the Arms in such condition as to take considerable time to repair them."⁷⁰ Washington estimated August 20, 1780, that "the consumption of Provisions, arms, accoutrements, and stores of every kind" had been doubled during the war by reason of the "carelessness and licentiousness incident to militia and irregular troops," and he cried out a month later: "no magazines can be equal to the demands of an army of militia, and none ever needed economy more than ours."⁷¹

There was no improvement in 1781. In fact the situation was, if possible worse than it had ever been. Governor Clinton, who knew the militia well, found the

⁶⁴ *Acts of the State of N. J.*, 1777, Chap. XX, Sec. 1; *Ibid.*, 1778, Chap. XXII, Sec. 6.

⁶⁵ *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, VI, 765.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 766, V, 104, 733.

⁶⁷ The illustrative material which follows in the above paragraph has been taken at random from a great mass of documentary material, all of which tells the same story.

⁶⁸ *Arch. of Pa.*, V, 655; see also *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton* III, 123.

⁶⁹ *Arch. of Pa.*, VI, 587; *Arch. of Md.*, XXI, 396.

⁷⁰ *Arch. of Pa.*, VII, 711.

⁷¹ Washington, *Writings*, (Ford ed.), VIII, 395, 441.

whole state of New York miserably wanting in arms and ammunition. Great quantities had from time to time been issued to them but he could not supply more from a depleted store because it would only be wasted.⁶² When the Maryland militia were called in August 1781, the arms, which had been repaired and cleaned a few months past were found to be "rendered useless by rust."⁶³ The Council could not arm a fraction of the militia called for service. Arms were issued in lots of twenty-five and fifty to supply the needs of entire counties, and when a county lieutenant had received his meagre share he could get no more.⁶⁴ The situation in Pennsylvania was so bad that President Reed, after numerous appeals for arms had reached him, wanted to know "whether every time the militia go out they expect to be supplied with new arms; if they do" said he, "it is the most extraordinary establishment in the World."⁶⁵ It was indeed "a most extraordinary establishment," for it was only necessary to place arms in the hands of the militia to have them disappear or be returned almost useless.

The public arms carried away by the militia were seldom recovered, because they were frequently hidden "and few cared to give information to the magistrates."⁶⁶ Even when such arms were located "the offenders offered defiance on the presumption that the state must offer proof and prove the property" and since many of the arms were unmarked, such proof was hard to obtain.⁶⁷ Powder and shot, with no possible means of identification, simply vanished.

It is extremely doubtful whether any measures within the power of the revolutionary state governments could have stopped the continuous waste of equipment, but conditions might not have been quite so bad if the militia officers had done their duty even passably well. It was their duty to inspect and check the equipment of their men at stated periods, and to take charge of all public accoutrements and keep them in good order. Above all they were enjoined to keep the executive department fully informed as to the state of their troops by means of frequent returns. In such matters, however, as in most others, they were negligent and remiss.⁶⁸ Despite repeated appeals they made returns but seldom, and such as they did make were likely to be incomplete by reason of their incompetence and lack of knowledge.⁶⁹ Because of such negligence on the part of officers, the various state executives, who were nominally commanders-in-chief of the militia, were

⁶² *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, VI, 765-766.

⁶³ *Arch. of Md.*, XLV, 52.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 389, 390, 392, 394, *passim*.

⁶⁵ *Arch. of Pa.*, IX, 271.

⁶⁶ *loc. cit.*

⁶⁷ *Arch. of Pa.*, VIII, 96.

⁶⁸ *Arch. of Md.*, XI, 90, 127, 128, 145, 214, 474, 522, XII, 261, 472, XXI, 258, 296; *Arch. of Pa.*, VI, 486; Force, *Am. Arch.*, (5th ser.), II, 366; *Jour. of the Prov. Cong. of N. Y.*, I, 800, II, 203; *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, II, 365, III, 522, 524, IV, 123, 211, 391; T. Sedgwick, *Life of Wm. Livingston*, pp. 197-198.

⁶⁹ Militia officers needed no qualifications except the ability to get elected. Between the periods of active service they were civilians engaged in the business of making a living and they were not expected to drop their private pursuits on accepting a commission. Moreover, they received no pay for performing their duties, except when in active service.

frequently kept in ignorance as to the state of the militia for more than a year at a time.⁷⁰ During the greater part of the war they could not have improved bad situations had they known of them, but there were occasions when some military stores were available which could have been sent to areas most in need of them.⁷¹ There were, of course, some officers who made returns with reasonable regularity and from such reports it is clear that the shortage was chronic,⁷² but for the most part the average militia officer inspected the arms and equipment of his men and looked to the condition of the magazine after the militia were called for immediate service, at which time he discovered that any ammunition previously issued had been wasted and that muskets were either non-existent or badly out of repair.

It is clear from the factors considered that the militia of the middle states were never equipped to render much in the way of effective field service. The original shortage of war-like equipment and the early diversion of the available supply to the Continental army got them off to a very bad start in 1776. Thereafter a combination of regulations which were never enforced, official incompetence and their own wastefulness and "lack of public virtue," kept them in a chronically unarmed condition. Tradition pictures the militia as being mustered and trained in their various localities between periods of active service and as showing a steady improvement during the course of the war,⁷³ but the tradition is not in accord

⁷⁰ Governor Clinton sent one of his numerous requests for a return of the militia, January 9, 1778. The commanding officer of Albany County, reported as follows February 5: "I am sorry that I am not able to send your Excellency a return of my brigade . . . I have had no returns made me from my colonels since July, 1776. I can furnish your Excellency with this but am well convinced that great alterations have taken place since that time." *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, II, 741. see also *Arch. of Md.*, XXI, 80; T. Sedgwick, *Life of Wm. Livingston*, p. 283.

⁷¹ *Arch. of Md.*, XLV, 256, 360; *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, IV, 123-125, 211, 391, VI, 95, 704.

⁷² Colonel Samuel Drake of Westchester County, New York, made frequent reports which were complete and informative. On August 5, 1780, he had a total of 446 men in his regiment and their equipment consisted of 212 guns, 146 bayonets, 167 cartridge boxes, no powder and no lead. *Public Papers of Geo. Clinton*, VI, 104. Joseph Beall, lieutenant of Prince George County, Maryland, reported July 3, 1780, that he could find only one piece belonging to the public and "but 246 pieces fit to fire in the whole county." *Arch. of Md.*, XLV, 4.

⁷³ The foundation for the tradition was laid during the War of Independence. In April, 1777, the Executive Council of Pennsylvania issued a statement to the effect that Philadelphia had been saved during the previous winter "by the vigorous and manly efforts of a few brave associators who generally stepped forward in defence of their country." William Livingston spoke in September 1777 of "the real bravery of our militia and the terror with which they have frequently struck the enemy," and the *New Jersey Gazette*, a Livingston press, carried articles praising the progress of the militia in the art of war with frequent references to the numerous occasions upon which they had filled the enemy with awe. President Reed of Pennsylvania stated publicly in 1779, "that the history of all countries, our own experience, and the testimony of our enemies, all concur to prove that a well regulated militia . . . is the best defence against an invading enemy and the surest safeguard of public liberty." The Maryland Council claimed in August 1781, that the militia had acquired a confidence which would "stimulate them to conduct which would not disgrace regulars." In view of the records it is difficult to escape the conclusion reached

with the facts. Laws prescribing periodic musters were on the statute books as an essential feature of all militia codes, but they were not observed. In all of the records pertaining to the militia, there are only a few scattered references to musters and training, and it is quite obvious that one of the primary reasons for the failure was that the militia had few or no arms and little ammunition with which to train. Moreover the efforts of both Continental and state authorities were directed, from 1776 to 1781, towards arming whatever portion of the militia were to take the field, not to arm and equip the vaster numbers who made up the reserve force at home. Whenever militia in service could be caught in time their arms were taken away, so that many went home as empty handed as they had come. If they escaped with the equipment, they possessed stolen property which they took pains to conceal, along with any arms and powder which they may have acquired by purchase.

In August 1780, William Livingston said "our militia through five years of war are become inured to arms."⁷⁴ As a piece of war-time propaganda uttered for public consumption such a statement is understandable, but Livingston knew better, for he had had experience with the militia both as an officer in the field and as a governor of New Jersey. On previous occasions he had said many things not so complimentary, and he would have been more accurate on this occasion if he had stated from his knowledge and experience that through five years of war the average militia man seldom had a gun in his hand except during his brief tour of duty, and that the spectacle of a fully accoutered militia man was indeed a rarity.

by Washington that the virtues of the militia system were extolled by men "whose credulity easily swallowed every vague story in support of a favorite hypothesis."

"*Selections from the Revolutionary Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey,*
p. 250

JACKSON'S FREDERICKSBURG TACTICS

By Branch Spalding

A MULTIPLICITY of historians have dealt with the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862). They present it with varying factual emphasis and, of course, with some display of divergent sympathies. All concur, however, on certain facts: Lee took up a strong position on the heights south and west of the Rappahannock River, commanding the river plain, with Longstreet's Corps on the left of his line and Jackson's Corps on the right; Burnside crossed the river and attacked that position with two separate columns; Sumner's Right Grand Division, heavily reinforced by elements of Hooker's Center Grand Division, hit that portion of Longstreet's Corps posted on Marye's Heights, back of the town of Fredericksburg, and was repulsed; somewhat simultaneously, the left column, Franklin's Left Grand Division, moved forward against that portion of Jackson's line in the vicinity of Hamilton's Crossing, the extreme Confederate right; a relatively small part of the Left Grand Division was employed, and Meade's Division of Reynolds' Corps, finding an interval in the Confederate line, handsomely drove through and penetrated to a depth of four hundred yards, only to be boxed off, compelled to withdraw, and narrowly escape capture or annihilation. By nightfall, the battle was over, and Lee had given the Army of the Potomac another costly lesson with regard to frontal assault of a strong defensive position.

Many writers mention the fact that Jackson's Corps occupied a front of slightly less than two miles, and roughly three brigades constituted the front line (Archer with two regiments of Brockenbrough, Lane, and Pender), the flanks of no one brigade being in contact with those of the next in line. Some of them make no comment on this unusual disposition, or the great depth of line which the three supporting divisions created (the Corps strength was 38,944¹). Others point to the "coincidence" that the breach between Archer and Lane afforded Meade his great opportunity. Some dwell on the fact that a German officer on Stuart's staff admonished about this condition before the battle. Some speak of it as a serious mistake. Most of them agree that it represents an oversight. One points to piecemeal arrival of the corps and exigency of the situation. A. P. Hill, 12,978 strong, arrived about 10:00 A.M., December 12.² Taliaferro came up by noon.³ During the night of December 12, and early morning of the thirteenth, Early's and D. H. Hill's Divisions came on the field.⁴ This is not an excessive time lapse for delivery of all units of a corps of some thirty-nine thousand men. Since the attack did not

¹ *War of the Rebellion, A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, vol. XXI, 1057. (Hereinafter referred to as O. R.). Army of Northern Virginia strength returns: source for all strength figures, unless otherwise indicated.

² O. R., 622 (Hood's report); 645 (A. P. Hill's report).

³ O. R., 675 (Taliaferro's report).

⁴ O. R., 663 (Early's report); 643 (D. H. Hill's report).

begin until 10:00 A.M. on the thirteenth,⁵ time was ample for closing the intervals in the front line with units of either A. P. Hill or Taliaferro. Argument could scarcely be supported that these dispositions were compelled by the exigency of time and the presence of the enemy. The presence of an enemy, a mile or more distant, and not yet deployed for attack, was no immediate threat in this sense.

It is a remarkable fact that not one of the historians suggests that this strange tactical disposition was employed by Jackson deliberately and with a design, or calls attention to the striking similarity between Jackson's formation and what is known in modern warfare as a flexible defense.

On a front of thirty-three hundred yards, Jackson's first line was occupied by three brigades of A. P. Hill's Division.⁶ On the right was Archer's Brigade and two regiments of Brackenbrough. In the center was Lane's Brigade, an interval of six hundred yards occurring between Lane and Archer.⁷ On the left and sharply refused, after another interval of six hundred yards, was Pender's Brigade.⁸ Lane's position was well in advance of Archer's and Pender's. Thus the intervals were both front and lateral for Lane; and one can readily understand the perturbation his report indicates that he felt before the attack.⁹ The aggregate strength of these front line units was approximately seventy-nine hundred.¹⁰

On the wooded high ground behind each of the intervals was posted a brigade along a military road four hundred to six hundred yards in rear, Gregg covering the right interval, and Thomas the left.¹¹ Behind Gregg, and supporting the right, was Early's entire Division; and behind Thomas, Taliaferro's Division. In general reserve was the large division of D. H. Hill (10,161 aggregate). Thus a thinly-manned front line (the garrison posted in three isolated units), was supported by deeply massed reserves, concealed in a forest and on a height. The force occupying the front line totaled seventy-nine hundred, while supports massed behind it totaled thirty-one thousand and made a one-mile depth of line. There were better than eleven men per yard of front.

In an age of close-order deployment and mass-line defense, here was an alluring invitation to an attacking force—but the kind of invitation the spider extended to the fly. All that the attackers had to do was march straight for one of those two wide intervals in the line (approximately six hundred yards each), taking as they advanced a terrific cross-fire of artillery and direct musketry, and the defense line would be cracked. After they had penetrated to a suitable depth, Stonewall Jackson would do the rest with that dense reserve of sixteen brigades

⁵ O. R., 630 (Jackson's report); 645 (A. P. Hill's report); 649 (R. L. Walker's report); 511 (Meade's report).

⁶ O. R., 630 (Jackson's report); 645 (A. P. Hill's report).

⁷ O. R., 654 (Lane's report); 656 (Archer's report).

⁸ O. R., 654; also field reconnaissance establishing battery positions and Pender's entrenchments.

⁹ O. R., 653 ff.


¹⁰ This figure is arrived at by taking the average regiment strength in A. P. Hill's Division and multiplying it by the number of regiments in line.

¹¹ O. R., 645 (A. P. Hill's report); confirmed by the reports of brigade commanders; 631 (Jackson's report).

masked in the thicket. He would box and butcher them. And that is precisely what happened to Meade's Division. It was an invitation to a Cannae.

All appointments were perfect, every detail arranged, even to the reception committee of one brigade posted behind each breach in the line, concealed in the forest and covering the military road. Witness the artillery disposition. Fourteen guns were placed in line with the right brigade. But note well that they were concealed in the woods as long as practicable and were not opened on Meade until his advance came within eight hundred yards. On the flank of this right brigade, fifteen more guns were in position to cross fire with the fourteen in line. On the left and front of the left brigade, twenty-one guns were placed (here was more crossing).¹² Meanwhile the fire of the infantry, disposed along a railroad fill and a supporting height, was reserved until the attacking force was within two hundred yards.¹³ After a deep infiltration of this line, it was only by masterly handling of his men that Meade was able to get out with a forty per cent casualty return.¹⁴

It is likely that a man as skilfull as Stonewall Jackson did a neat job like this and did not know he was doing it? It is likely that he arranged this perfect death



¹² O. R., 636 (Report of Crutchfield, Corps Chief of Artillery, confirmed by numerous other reports, is source for artillery employment). The reports of A. P. Hill (645) and his Chief of Artillery, R. L. Walker (649) verify the withholding of fire.

¹³ O. R., 656 (Archer's report); 658 (Report of Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Hutchins, 19th Georgia); 661 (Report of Lieutenant Colonel Lockert).

¹⁴ O. R., 512 (Meade's report).

party for the Union I Corps just by carelessly neglecting to close two intervals in his line, the neglect continuing after warnings from enterprising young staff officers and brigade commanders who knew perhaps one-tenth as much about the art of war as Jackson? Could the whole thing have been just an accident, or, "an error of judgment which cost many lives," as even so eminent an historian as G. F. R. Henderson describes it?¹⁶

Is it not more likely that it was a deliberate trap, carefully planned and set by the "Old Fox" in one of his most brilliant and characteristic moments? If so, it was planned and executed with such acumen and Jacksonian secrecy that even his own staff officers knew not of it; or, if they did, they never told. Like most of Jackson's plans, it worked superbly.

Much has been made of the marshy ground between Archer and Lane. The time-honored theory is that Jackson considered this marsh impassable; hence his failure to occupy that portion of the line. Then, it is reasoned, the cold weather froze the marsh and it became passable; thus Jackson was not altogether guilty of bad judgment (his staunch Calvanistic piety not extending to direct communication with the Deity on future turns of the weather). At least two external facts impugn that theory: first, the marsh is not impassable today, and probably was not in 1862; second, it was just as cold when Jackson made his dispositions as when Meade's troops penetrated his line: there had been cold weather with snow on the ground for several days, but it is very questionable that it was cold enough to freeze the marsh to any considerable depth.¹⁷ Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the interval left between Lane and Pender was on dry ground.

It is worthy of careful note that, shortly before the battle, Jackson himself paused at Gregg's position behind the interval between Archer and Lane, and predicted that the enemy would attack there.¹⁸

Whether Jackson, on December 13, 1862, was simply laying a deadly trap to annihilate Yankees, or was doing both that and consciously experimenting with new defense dispositions which might be practiced in a world war a half-century later, on undreamed-of front widths, is an imponderable question. But careful comparison of his formations at Fredericksburg with corps and army masses on the Eastern Front during the World War offers a profitable and interesting investment of time for the modern military student. It may conduce to the opinion that Stonewall Jackson was not only the smartest general officer on the field at Fredericksburg, but he was also ancestor of the modern flexible defense.

¹⁶ G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (New York and Bombay, 1904), II, 310.

¹⁷ O. R., 588 (Kershaw's report). This report is most explicit; many other reports and reminiscences of participants confirm it.

¹⁸ R. L. Dabney, *Life and Campaigns of Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson* (New York, 1866), 610. This instance is accepted and cited by most biographers of Jackson. John Esten Cooke and Douglas S. Freeman state that both Lee and Jackson inspected the lines on the morning of the thirteenth. *Stonewall Jackson, a Military Biography* (New York, 1876), p. 371; and R. E. Lee, *a Biography* (New York and London, 1935), II, 455.

PROFESSIONAL NEWS

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER

In the ballot submitted recently to the membership certain changes in the by-laws of this organization were approved almost unanimously. Reduced to simplest terms the changes authorized are:

1. That this organization hereafter is to be known as the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE.
2. That the Board of Trustees may at its own discretion increase its membership from eleven to nineteen persons provided that such an increase "shall be only for the purpose of giving the interests of cooperating organizations representation upon the Board." All such elections, however, must be confirmed by the membership at its first annual meeting following such action by the Board.
3. That the Board of Trustees shall have the power to elect as permanent Fellows of the Institute a restricted number of persons whom it considers to have made a distinguished contribution to knowledge or thought in the field of the organization's interests.

In addition the membership overwhelmingly approved the election or reelection of the present Board of Trustees in its entirety.

The vote on the adoption of the title "Warfare" for the magazine, however, was by no means so unanimous. While it appears that a majority favor the suggested name such definite opposition was expressed that the Board of Trustees and the officers feel it would be unwise to make a change at the present time. Therefore the magazine will retain its former style of title becoming, effective this issue, THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE.

It gives me pleasure to announce that the Board of Trustees has appointed Mr. Elbert Huber to the official staff of the Institute in the capacity of Bursar. He will also perform the duties of Treasurer until an appointment to this office has been made by the Board.

In closing I should like to make it clear that notwithstanding the changes outlined above the Institute does not contemplate any abandonment of its original purposes. On the contrary, all the changes which have been made within past years and all the plans which are now in the process of adoption have been designed primarily to ensure continued concentration upon the objectives as determined by the Incorporators.

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM L. RODGERS, *President*

With this issue Mr. Philip T. McLean, Bibliographer, and Mr. Dimitry Krassovsky, Curator of Slavic Collections of the Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace (formerly the Hoover War Library) join the staff as associate editors.

* * *

Among the projects undertaken and proposed by the staffs of the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Parks are the permanent marking of the Military Road on the Fredericksburg Battlefield, the reconstruction of a part of the Stonewall at Fredericksburg, and the reopening of the Jackson Trail on the Chancellorsville Battlefield.

Traces of the Military Road still exist on park property. It was of great value to Lee, whose engineers cut it through the woods to facilitate movements behind the Confederate line during the battle of Fredericksburg, December, 1862.

The Stonewall along the Sunken Road, just west of the town itself, is perhaps one of the best known terrain-features in American military history. This wall, partly a free standing and partly a retaining wall, provided perfect shelter for the Confederate infantry of McLaws' Division. Every Federal wave hurled against it was stopped; not a single Federal reached it on that bloody day of December 13, 1862. Part of the old wall still stands. The reconstruction will bound the lot of the Headquarters and Museum Building, and will abut on U. S. Highway No. 1.

The Jackson Trail in the Chancellorsville area is the woods route used by Stonewall Jackson's Corps of Lee's Army on the famous flank march which led to the attack against Hooker's exposed right wing, May 2, 1863. The trail will not be a hard-surfaced road like other park drives, but will mirror the terrain conditions of Jackson's day. Thus there will be at least one such road for serious students. It is desirable for the other park roads, which are in most cases historical rather than historic, to be hard-surfaced. They have been built to follow trench lines and reach important sites. The Jackson Trail, on the other hand, is the old road itself.

* * *

This year should prove an important one for collectors and experts in the field of historical firearms. Four publications are now under way, of which at least two are due to appear within the next six months.

Otto Ulbrich Co., Inc., of Buffalo, N. Y., is planning to issue Major Arcadi Gluckman's "United States Martial Pistols and Revolvers," a detailed study of these weapons from 1799 to the present day. Major Gluckman does not confine himself to the Regulars but covers the martial pistols used by the militia, volunteers, and individual officers. He plans to include suitable indexes, lists of patentees, a glossary of nomenclature, and a bibliography.

Of equal import is the projected issuance by L. D. Satterlee of Detroit, Mich., of a second and considerably enlarged edition of his *Catalog of Firearms for the Collector*. The first edition, published in 1927, is now out of print. To experts

in the field this catalog needs no introduction; its twenty-two half-tone plates and numerous cuts have made it a valuable reference book and an indispensable aid to collectors. The new edition will cover American weapons and some foreign, but will as a rule exclude shotguns and handmade arms. The lists of patents, gun companies and the like will be enlarged.

A guide of a different sort is being compiled by Virgil Ney of Omaha, Nebraska. This will be a directory of all collectors and specialists of arms in the United States, arranged by states, which should prove of great assistance in fostering cooperation within the field.

James E. Hicks of Mt. Vernon, N. Y., has recently announced his "Notes on U. S. Ordnance, 1776-1938," a work now in preparation. The first volume is designed to cover military shoulder arms, bayonets, hand weapons, ammunition, and machine guns. Readers of the JOURNAL will be familiar with Captain Hicks' treatment of this subject and those who have read his *Notes on French Ordnance, 1717 to 1936* (reviewed in this issue) will be pleased to know that André Janot has been selected to do the pen-and-ink illustrations.

Further details concerning any of these works may be secured through the INSTITUTE.

* * *

The author of "Battle on the Vistula," Dr. Clarence A. Manning, is Acting Executive Officer of the Department of East European Languages of Columbia University, from which institution he received his Ph.D. degree in 1915. During the World War he served with the Corps of Intelligence Police, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, where he was attached to the Translation Section. He is at present a Lieutenant Colonel, MI Reserve. His decorations include: Commander of Polonia Restituta, Commander of White Star of Estonia, Commander of Three Stars of Latvia, Officer of the White Lion of Czechoslovakia, Officer of the Crown of Yugoslavia. His article is based upon a paper read at the Army War College in 1935.

Dr. Hugh Jameson is Professor of History at Northern Illinois State Teachers College, having taught previously at the University of Michigan. He has made a particular study of early militia organization in the middle states from 1775 to 1781, this being the subject of his doctoral dissertation.

Colonel John W. Wright, who is a Trustee of the INSTITUTE, has had a distinguished career in the Army and in the field of American military history. Graduated from George Washington University in 1898, he has seen commissioned service since that year. During the World War he was assistant chief of staff, G-3, at Headquarters, Services of Supply, where for his vital work he was awarded the Distinguished-Service Medal in 1919. The experience gained then in problems of billeting, supply, and directing troop movements renders him peculiarly fitted to be the author of a study on contributions in early warfare. Colonel Wright has written on military subjects for the *American Historical Review*, *The William and Mary College Quarterly*, and other periodicals and is a co-author of *Warfare*.



THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution, by
Victor Andres Belaunde. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1938. Pp. 398.
\$3.50.)

The present volume is essentially a compilation from the following series: lectures on Bolivar given at the Sorbonne in 1927; lectures used in a course on the Hispanic American revolutions given at the University of Miami in 1928 and 1929; and the Albert Shaw lectures delivered at the Johns Hopkins University in 1930 to honor the centenary of the Liberator's death.

The study is more than a treatise on Bolivarian thought in relation to the political thought concerning the Spanish American revolutions. It is a detailed analysis of the Liberator's political thinking in relation to both the ideological currents of eighteenth century Europe and their related rivulets in Spanish America. In the analysis the author does not permit his idol to be swept into the maelstrom of European thought and lost; rather he preserves for him unquestionable originality and power amidst all the confusion and distraction. He does admit that "variations" begin to appear in Bolivar's thought after the independence of America has been achieved; but these "variations" only indicate the Liberator's humanness, his responsiveness to the American environment and to the ideas of his friends.

The author's unfortunate personal experience has perhaps colored the book a bit here and there. His exile from his native Peru during the third decade of the present century undoubtedly has caused him to warn all arbitrary and brutally despotic governments that they cannot claim parentage in Bolivar's concept. But on the whole the story is free from bias and prejudice. Indeed, it shows a breadth of learning and interpretation that is enviable in this day and age.

Eight of the thirty chapters have appendices which contain much pertinent information. There is also a large selective bibliography and an unusually good index to enhance the volume's usefulness. The editorial work seems to have been performed in a manner in keeping with the series.

LAWRENCE F. HILL

Ohio State University

Marlborough: His Life and Times, by Winston S. Churchill. Volume VI, 1708-1722. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1938. Pp. 672. \$2.75.)

The final volume of this definitive biography is published only five years after the appearance of the first. During the writing of these 2,561 pages their author has emerged from an eclipse much like that suffered by his subject, into a position of leadership in opposition to the present ministry. The temptation to make comparisons must have been almost irresistible. The intrigues of Harley and St. John with the aid of Mrs. Masham, favorite of Queen Anne, might easily recall the Cliveden set, especially since it led to the abandonment by England of her allies and the disgraceful peace of Utrecht. Louis XIV, the Hitler of that day, was allowed to win a peace, after losing a war. The parallels are numerous, though of course never exact, but Churchill does not indulge them.

He does point out, however, that whereas in 1819 Archdeacon Coxe could condemn Utrecht because of the hundred years of France's power that had culminated in Napoleon, a century later "we may perhaps be content that an overweening Germany did not sooner present to us the menace which our ancestors recognized in France." And since the future cannot be foretold "one rule of conduct alone survives as a guide to men in their wanderings: fidelity to covenants, the honour of soldiers, and the hatred of causing human woe." And he disclaims historical impartiality "where the consequences of men's actions produce such frightful calamities for millions of humble folk, and may rob great nations of their destiny."

But with these exceptions he points few morals to adorn his tale of Marlborough's final victories, of his fall from power and favor, and of his restoration to honor after the accession of George I. It is in this period that parliamentary decree fastened upon England's greatest general the charges of peculation that have since clouded his memory. Churchill's attempt to disprove these charges cannot be dismissed as mere whitewashing. It is too well documented for that. On page after page are to be found the asterisks that indicate letters and papers never before made public and their cumulative effect cannot be summarily dismissed. Marlborough has been unfortunate in the literary quality of what has been written against him. Swift and Defoe were propagandists for his political opponents; in later years their lead was followed by Thackeray and Macaulay. But even before Churchill wrote, George Macaulay Trevelyan and Sir John Fortescue had done much to overcome the effect of contemporary political libels. There remains the curious correspondence with the exiled Stuarts, but the political morality of the present day offers few standards on which to charge that sort of thing as treason.

It is amazing that so tremendous a biography should have been produced by a man still active in public life, who has simultaneously written other books, one of which, indeed, was published only a few weeks ago. And while it will be no doubt subjected to sharp criticism, it is little likely that any more thorough life of Marlborough will ever be written. Its handling of the military phases—in the

present volume the battle of Malplaquet and the passage of the *Ne Plus Ultra* lines, for example, leave little to be added, except perhaps in interpretation and application. Its political discussions, while no doubt prejudiced—and it is difficult to avoid falling in with all the prejudices—yet pay generous tribute to the abilities of such enemies of Marlborough as Harley and St. John.

As mere argument, a much smaller work might have sufficed. But the documentation has fully justified the six volumes. Despite its length, it is not dull. A wealth of background has been painted in; a departed age with many lessons for us has been brought to life. Undoubtedly it is one of the great biographies.

The author and his publishers are especially to be commended for their lavish use of maps that make it possible to follow with ease every detail of military operations.

DON RUSSELL

Chicago, Illinois

Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919, General Series, Vol. I, from the outbreak of the war to the formation of the Canadian Corps, August 1914-September, 1915. By Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid. (Ottawa: The King's Printer, 1938. Pp. 596. \$4.00. Maps and Documents: Pp. 458. \$3.00.)

This is the first instalment of the official history of Canada's military effort during the Great War. It consists of two parts bound separately, one the narrative, the other an appendix which comprises documents, tables, and maps. The period covered embraces the recruiting, equipping, and concentration of the first division in Canada, its transportation overseas in October, 1914, its training under canvas during the abnormally wet winter of 1914-1915, its appearance on the French front in the attack on Neuve Chapelle, March 11 and 12, 1915, and finally its removal to the Ypres salient about the middle of April.

The chief interest of the volume, however, centers around the role of the division in the defense of the salient during the second battle of Ypres between April 22 and May 4, 1915. At five o'clock on the afternoon of April 22, 1915, the German Fourth Army attacked the north face of the salient held by two French divisions in this attack making use for the first time of asphyxiating gas (chlorine) released under pressure from steel cylinders buried in the parapets. Within an hour, they had completely overrun the French positions on a front of nearly six miles to a depth of three, their advance carrying them at its farthest point to the east bank of the Yser canal. Had night not prevented the attack being followed up, Ypres must have fallen. But during the dark, Canadian battalions by a series of counter-attacks built up a new front and so anticipated a thrust southwestwards in the rear of Ypres. On April 24 the Germans (XXVI Corps) endeavored to follow up their advantage by a second drive, against the tip of the salient to roll up the British line southwards. St. Julien, the bastion of their new front was given up, and the immediate loss of the Gravenstafel

ridge only averted by the timely intervention of troops of the 84th Brigade of the 28th Division and of the York and Durham Brigade, Northumberland Division, thrown in apparently on the initiative of Major-General Snow of the 27th Division. Further attacks on the 26th forced the British off the Gravenstafel ridge but they stubbornly contested every foot of the German advance out of deference to the wishes of the French who still had hopes of restoring their original position to the north of the salient. Finally on the collapse of these attacks the British shortened and strengthened their line by withdrawing to a new position running from Frezenberg through Hooge and Sanctuary Ridge on the night of May 3-4. Further attacks failed to dislodge them from their new lines.

Colonel Duguid's account of these events is lively and straightforward for the most part, but he fails to clear up the reasons for the collapse of Canadian resistance on the afternoon of April 24th. Of course after the disaster that overtook the French, the Canadian position was untenable, and more experienced troops would have withdrawn from their exposed position. But their very neglect of the principles of sound tactics disconcerted the German staff and forced them after considerable delay to divert troops to garner the fruits of victory. A second use of gas had enabled them to smother the 15th Battalion front and take in reverse the 3rd Canadian Brigade on the northwest face of the new salient. The artillery of the 3rd Brigade threatened by the presence of German troops within rifle range on their left flank had been withdrawn and could not respond to the s.o.s. of the infantry. Rifles under the stress of rapid fire jammed (the Canadians were issued with the Ross rifle instead of the regulation Lee-Enfield). But one is at a loss to know why the exposed left of the 2nd Brigade held while the right of the 3rd collapsed. St. Julien was given up and apparently the brigadier ordered retirement to G.H.Q. 2nd line, a mile and a half southwest of St. Julien. It fell to the British regiments thrust into the gap to prevent the Germans from taking the whole British line in reverse. The British failed to reap the fruits of this victory by reoccupying St. Julien, but managed finally to stem the tide of the German advance.

One notes an appalling disparity between the casualties of the two sides. Despite the alleged superiority of the fire-power of the defense, the German casualties according to official admission amounted only to 34,873 while the combined French and British loss is estimated at 80,000. Even if one deducts the losses borne by the French in the gas attack (estimated at 18,000), casualties among the defensive forces were almost double that of the offense. Moreover these reverses were inflicted on an enemy whose combined forces outnumbered the German forces in the west by 54% (1726 battalions to 1156 according to the German computation). Thus painfully did the British (and to a less extent their allies) redress the balance of superior training and preparation against them.

The maps prepared by Captain J. J. P. Neal are excellent but the general reader misses a key to the system of grid lines and coordinates as carried on the

ordnance maps. This reviewer has not been able to detect errors other than those noted in the Addenda and Corrigenda inserted in the text.

S. R. TOMPKINS

University of Oklahoma

John Phoenix, Esq., the Veritable Squibob: A Life of Captain George H. Derby,
U. S. A., by George R. Stewart. (New York: Henry Holt and Company.
1937. Pp. 242. \$2.50.)

George H. Derby, 1823-1861, was by birth a New Englander, by education an army officer, by profession a Topographical Engineer, and by inclination a humorist. Graduated from West Point in time to win a brevet in the Mexican War, he was destined to spend much of the rest of his life on frontier duty. More particularly, he was stationed on the Pacific coast of gold rush days most of the time from 1849 through 1856. There he found congenial surroundings, warm friends, a beloved wife, and an *alter ego*. While Derby the engineer explored the lower Colorado River, improved the San Diego harbor, and built roads in the Pacific Northwest, Squibob the jester, later John Phoenix, played practical jokes, drew amusing cartoons, and wrote satirical pieces about army life, the Pacific coast, and anything else that came to mind. Derby was known to a limited professional circle as a capable engineer, but Phoenix was known and quoted from San Francisco to London as the wit of California.

Professor Stewart, who is interested in western literature rather than in military history, has intentionally given us "a biography of that rare spirit John Phoenix rather than of its enveloping corporality the steady army officer, George Horatio Derby." We can scarcely quarrel with an author's purpose in writing a book, especially when he has produced a volume as well written and interesting as this. Rather, we should be thankful that an "outsider" has treated so fully an unusual phase of an officer's life more adequately than we, without his specialized knowledge, could have done. But, conversely, it may not be inappropriate to remark that a greater knowledge of military affairs and of the sources of military history might have improved his interpretation of the fun-loving officer.

It is felt, for instance, that Dr. Stewart has rather forced the Phoenix humor in places, especially where he suggests that Derby's published reports include statements more daring than those of his dry-as-dust brother officers. Even official reports, "prepared for the approval of stuffy bureaucrats in Washington" by men with less of the whimsical strain in them than Derby, frequently contain passages which are not dull reading. Furthermore, some of Derby's unpublished reports, of which there are many in The National Archives among the records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, illustrate his facetiousness much better than anything quoted from his published reports. For example, in October, 1855, after fighting the rain and underbrush in the mountains between Astoria and Salem, Oregon, he wrote that he was "convinced (anomalous as it may seem) that the survey of a military road in a country like this, should be made after the road

is constructed." Lieutenant Derby was in dead earnest and gave excellent reasons for his suggestion, but it must have been John Phoenix who prompted the idea. Had this collection been used, the author might have amplified somewhat the military side of Derby's career as well as have found more convincing examples of humor in his professional writings.

JESSE S. DOUGLAS

The National Archives

The Ramparts We Watch: A Study of the Problems of American National Defense, by George Fielding Eliot. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1938. Pp. 370. \$3.00.)

This stimulating book on the problems of national defense appeared by chance of fate (and admirable timing) on the book stalls of the nation twenty years to a day after the armistice of 1918, and on the morrow of a European crisis of great intensity. It enjoys, therefore, a livelier prospect of influencing the public mind than any previous work on American military policy. American citizens, who have been described as "war-like but un-military," have demonstrated in the past an unshakable immunity from concern over military matters. Although willing to pay taxes for the support of a defense force, Americans are unwilling to read a book on military policy. From frontier days on we have shown a costly aptitude for solving military problems after the war is upon us by the fateful methods of improvisation. This apathy may explain why an outstanding work such as Emory Upton's *The Military Policy of the United States* languished for years in the files of the War Department before it was rescued by Secretary Root. It also accounts for the fact that Admiral Mahan was widely recognized in Europe before he was in the United States.

Major Eliot begins with the premise that, unfortunately for all concerned, force is the final arbiter of nations. Accepting this idea, he examines the defense problems of the United States on the basis of a review of our foreign policy and our military and naval programs. The studied impartiality of the author, his reserved language, his sane approach to the problem, and his honest efforts to reconcile a military policy adequate for our defense with the preservation of democratic institutions and a free industrial system, should appeal very strongly to the reader.

The author believes that any scheme of American strategy should be based upon the following general ideas. (1) The United States should maintain a fleet superior to that of any possible combination of antagonists in either ocean. (2) This fleet should be concentrated in one ocean. (3) The United States should maintain an army adequate for the defense of the bases of the fleet, commercial harbors, and suitable for dealing with any conceivable landing. (4) The Panama Canal should be rendered immune from attack. (5) Any military program adopted by the United States should be a balanced program. (6) It

threatened in the future the United States should be prepared to act offensively and should not be tied to a policy of passive defense.

The Vinson Act having laid the basis for a balanced American fleet, adequate with contemplated additions for present contingencies, Major Eliot feels that if this balanced fleet is maintained at a strength sufficient to control the seas in our hemisphere, a large American army is not necessary for our defense. He estimates that a well-trained army of some 205,000 regular troops adequately equipped and supplied, capable of action within twenty-four hours, plus a reserve of 18 divisions of the National Guard, plus a G.H.Q. air force of 1000 planes, would be able to strike a terrific and immediate blow against any enemy force that could reach our shores. This force would also be adequate for expeditionary service of a limited nature. Such a force, however, is not designed for long-drawn out operations on foreign continents. It is not capable of being expanded indefinitely. But Major Eliot argues that our military policy should be directed toward the goal of maintaining an army invincible on our own terrain and in our island possessions, and that we should forget about the tentative organization of armies designed for large-scale, transoceanic adventuring.

Major Eliot does not believe that we can bring peace to a warring world, but he insists that we can maintain peace in our own hemisphere. We may not be able to settle European or Asiatic quarrels, but we can prevent them from dumping their quarrels on our doorstep. We cannot shut ourselves off from the other nations of the world, but we can command the seas which others must utilize if they are to act against us.

Three appendixes show the present organization of the United States Naval Bureaus, War Department organizations and administration, and describe the military schools maintained by the government. A number of well-executed maps, a short selected bibliography, and an index complete the volume.

H. A. DE WEERD

Denison University

Notes on French Ordnance, 1717 to 1936, by James E. Hicks, with illustrations by André Jandot. (Mt. Vernon, N. Y. 1938. Pp. 287. \$3.50.)

Arms and the man should always be concomitant themes of military history. The human element however is too frequently considered without the slightest reference to the armament employed, and this prevents sound comprehension of the tactics of the past. Anyone who has searched for information on weapons of previous wars knows what a difficult task it is to find such data. The military historian, therefore, should welcome books that facilitate research of this kind.

As far as the French Army is concerned, there is no longer any reason to lack essential information on its ordnance equipment. This book is a thoroughly reliable source of information on the small arms and artillery material used in France from 1717 to 1936. Captain Hicks shows the chronological development of infantry and cavalry weapons of all types, followed by similar treatment of

artillery material and its projectiles. A small section devoted to tanks and steel helmets indicates that nothing has been omitted from the entire field. Brief descriptions of each weapon are supplemented by M. André Jandot's excellent drawings which show the appearance of many of the weapons described.

An omission must be noted in the data on the earlier types of weapons. For the small arms and artillery of the Napoleonic period and for some of the later weapons, the effective range and the rate of fire are not given. The smoothbore flintlock muzzle-loading gun, model 1777 and the musket, model 1800, had an effective range of 150 to 300 yards with a rate of fire of approximately 1½ rounds per minute. The maximum range of the artillery of the Napoleonic era was about 1500 yards. In the Franco-Prussian War the French breech loading Chassepot rifle had an effective range of 1300 yards with a rate of fire of 11 to 12 rounds per minute. The rifled French artillery of that war had an effective range of about 2,000 yards, while the smoothbore muzzle-loading artillery was limited to approximately 1500 yards effective range.

This illustrated history of French ordnance shows the progress in fire power which completely transformed tactics in the period covered. Its distinction consists not only in the fact that it is unique in conception, but that it is also well arranged, accurate and complete.

Lt. Col. DONALD ARMSTRONG

Office of the Chief of Ordnance

T. E. Lawrence to His Biographer, Robert Graves: Information about himself in the form of letters, notes and answers to questions, edited with a critical commentary: T. E. Lawrence to His Biographer, Liddell Hart: Information about himself in the form of letters, notes, answers to questions and conversations (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., Pp. 187-ix; 233-viii, two volumes, edition limited to 1,000 copies, \$20.)

T. E. Lawrence during his lifetime authorized two biographies, that by Liddell Hart being originally intended as a history of the Arab revolt, the other by Mr. Graves being more personal, with much of the campaign accounts rewritten from the then very limited "Seven Pillars of Wisdom." In both cases Lawrence read the manuscript and made numerous corrections, some additions, and many interpretations. All of this material is reproduced in the companion volumes, with many letters and other commentary. They add much to our information about details of the campaigns, and as well throw much light on the personality of the curious character whom Liddell Hart ranks as one of the greatest military commanders.

A popular edition is promised after the publication of the Lawrence letters, being edited by David Garnett.

DON RUSSELL

Chicago, Illinois

OTHER RECENT BOOKS**1. United States and Great Britain**

The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. Volume V: The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Main German Offensive, 1918, by C. E. W. Bean. (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 825). "This volume narrates the part played by the Australian Corps in the barring of the German advance upon Amiens in 1918, and the similar part of the 1st Australian Division in the saving of Hazebrouck . . . Appendices describe the participation of Australians in the Mesopotamian and Northwest Persian campaigns . . . ; and the episode in which the great airman Richthofen, met his death." (Preface, v.)

Alarms and Excursions, by Sir Tom Bridges. (London: Longmans, Green & Company. 1938. Pp. 361. \$4.20.) The memoirs of Lt. Gen. Bridges, K.C.B., D.S.O., LL.D., who served as British representative to the headquarters of the Belgian commander-in-chief, King Albert, during the World War.

Two Soldiers: The Campaign Diaries of Thomas J. Key, C.S.A. and Robert J. Campbell U.S.A., edited by Wirt Armistead Cate. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1938. Pp. 277. \$2.50.) The diaries of two Civil War officers, that of Captain Key being the most complete and valuable. He was an intelligent observer on close terms with Confederate generals. Campbell was captured at Atlanta on July 22, 1864, and Key later used the blank pages of Campbell's diary in order to complete his own.

Elihu Root, by Philip C. Jessup. (New York: Dodd, Meade & Company. 1938. 2 vols. Pp. 563 and 586. \$7.50.) A life of the greatest American peace-time secretary of war who reorganized the War Department, established the general staff, and reconstituted the National Guard.

The War in the Air. Being the Story of the Part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force. Volume VI and Appendix volume. By H. A. Jones. (London: Oxford University Press. 1937. Pp. 583.) "In this final volume the story of the war operations and developments of the air services is brought to a conclusion by narratives dealing with the events leading to the creation of the Royal Air Force; with supply and man-power problems; the genesis and work of the Independent Force; the campaigns in 1918 in Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Syria, in Mesopotamia, Persia and Russian Azerbaijan, in Macedonia and in Italy; with air action throughout the war in India, with naval aircraft co-operation in 1918 in home waters and in the Mediterranean; and with the Allied offensives on the Western front." (Preface, v.)

2. Western Europe

Figures de Chefs: Joffre, Fayolle, Maistre, le Général Serret en Alsace, by Henry Bordeaux. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 1937. Pp. 428.) Four essays on the lives of French military leaders of first rank by a military historian who held several posts on the French General Staff during the World War.

Rue St. Dominique et G. Q. G., ou les Trois Dictatures de la Guerre, by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Bugnet. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 1937. Pp. 331.) Rue St. Dominique, used as the title of this book, is the street on which the French Ministry of War is located. The work is an account of the relations between the three Commanders-in-Chief and the various Ministers of War, 1914-1918. The study is divided into three parts: (1) the "dictatorship of Joffre or of the High Command," during which the War Ministers were Messimy, Galliéni, and Roques; (2) the "dictatorship of Parliament" (Dec. 12, 1916-Nov. 13, 1918), during which the War Ministers were Lyautey and Painlevé; and (3) the "dictatorship of Clemenceau or of the Government," with Clemenceau as both Minister of War and Prime Minister. It contains many excellent sketches of military and political figures. The author concludes that the direction of war is a question of personalities rather than a question of decrees and regulations.

Mes Souvenirs, by General Adolphe Messimy. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 1937. Pp. 428.) General Messimy was the French Minister of Colonies in 1911, Minister of War in the Caillaux Cabinet of 1911, and Minister of War in the Viviani Cabinet of June 16-August 26, 1914. A work of importance because of its information concerning the period immediately preceding and succeeding the French declaration of war. Of especial interest are the chapters which deal with the action of the Ministry of War in August 1914 in its efforts to place the French nation on a war-time basis, and the reactions of military and political leaders to such efforts.

Der Gaskampf und die Chemischen Kampfstoffe, by Julius Meyer. (Leipzig: Hirzel. 1938, 3 aufl. Pp. 376.) A manual of gas warfare written by a professor at the Breslau University and Technical High School. It presents a study of the general nature of gas warfare and the practical requirements of its use in the field. Its employment during the years 1914-1918 is described with useful diagrams. A portion of the book is devoted to a description of about fifty of the various types of war gases, their characteristics, their manufacture, and their effect on human beings. The author feels that in future wars, gas will play a minor role in comparison with high explosives and shells.

3. *Eastern Europe and Asia*

Manevrennyi period 1914 g. Lodzinskaia operatsiia [Maneuver period of 1914. Lodz operations], A. Kh. Bazarevskii, ed. Series: *Sbornik dokumentov Mirovoi imperialisticheskoi voyny na russkom fronte (1914-1917)* (Moscow. 1936. Pp. 505 and atlas.) The General Staff of the Red army, in publishing the military documents of 1914-1917, proposes to give a concrete military-historical study of the compilation of strategic plans by the various commanders. This collection contains 557 copies of original documents from the Moscow Military-Historical Archives, including those disclosing the

intentions of the Russian Supreme Command, which bear on the so called Lodz front operations from October 19, 1914, to January 18, 1915.

Plan voïny 1914-1917 g. [Plan of the War, 1914-1917], by N. N. Golovin. (Paris, 1936. Pp. 279). The author, a former professor of the Russian Academy of General Staff, gives the history of the development of the plan of war according to which two-fifths of the Russian force were directed against Germany and only one-fifth against Austro-Hungary. Regardless of the fact that Austria had General Conrad and a much better plan of war, she was defeated: a strategic paradox. Paradox two is that the Russians, who entered the War in order to reinstate the rights and independence of Serbia, reached their goal, but were wrecked themselves. These two paradoxes, the author explains, became possible since Russian strategy was based upon a spiritual principle: "Perish yourselves, but help your comrades."

Mirovaja voïna; nashi operatsii na Votochno-Prusskom fronte zimoju 1915 g. *Vospominaniia i mysli* [The World War; our operations on the East-Prussian front in Winter of 1915. Reminiscences and thoughts], by Lt. Gen. Khol'msen. (Paris, 1935. Pp. 314.) Description of the most fatal event of the World War on the Russian front: the destruction of the XX Army Corps at Avgustov in February 1915. Written by a participant, the commander of one of the brigades.

Sarykamyshskaiā operatsiia na Kavkazskom fronte Mirovoi voïny v 1914-1915 godu [The Sarykamysh operations on the Caucasian front of the World War in 1914-1915], by N. Korsun. (Moscow: Nar.kom.oborony. 1937. Pp. 161.) Published by the military academy in Moscow and based on Turkish archival and printed sources. Describes the operations of the Turkish army of Enver-Pasha in the winter of 1914-15 against the Russian Caucasian army. Intended for the study of mountain war in winter time.

Zapiski uchastnika Mirovoi voïny; 26 piekhotnaiā diviziia v operatsiakh 1-i i 2-i russkikh armii na Vostochno-Prusskom i Pol'skom teatrakh v nachale voïny [Memoirs of a participant in the World War; 26th Infantry Division in operations of the 1st and 2d Russian Armies on the East-Prussian and Polish front at the beginning of the War], by IA. M. Larionov. (Harbin. 1937.) Based on the diary and documents of the author, this book reveals a tragic failure of the Russian advance in East Prussia and the operations on the left bank of the Vistula River in 1914.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Dorothy C. Barck, "A List of 500 Inhabitants of New York City in 1775 . . .," in *The New-York Historical Society Quarterly Bulletin*, January 1939 (XXIII, 23-31). Documented account of the seizure and use of British muskets at the outbreak of the American Revolution.

Major E. M. Benitez, "Cavalry Operations in Spain," in *The Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1939 (XLVIII, 12-17ff.).

Major Elbridge Colby, "A Battle of Civilians," in *The Military Engineer*, January-February 1939 (XXXI, 49-57). Account of the engagement at Bethel Church, Va., June 20, 1861. Lack of proper training of newly enrolled troops is emphasized. Extensive tactical details are given of this skirmish which occurred before First Bull Run.

George Fielding Eliot, "Hugh A. Drum," in *Scribner's*, February 1939 (CY, 5-9). A leading military theorist reviews the career of a top flight officer with most readable results.

Harvey S. Ford, "Why War Is So Popular," in *The American Mercury*, February 1939 (XLVI, 136-43). An explanation of this phenomenon on the basis of heroism and freedom from responsibility.

W. Ivor Jennings, "British Organization for Rearmament," in *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1938 (LIII, 481-490). A discussion of governmental changes made to accommodate an expanding defense program.

Cedric Larson and James R. Mock, "The Lost Files of the Creel Committee," in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, January 1939 (III, 5-29). Based on original material in The National Archives.

Maurice C. Latta, "The Offensive Defensive Balance in History," in *The Reserve Officer*, January 1939.

William B. McGroarty, "Captain Cameron and Sergeant Champe," in *William and Mary College Quarterly*, January 1939 (2 ser., XIX, 49-54). Short analysis of the characters and events surrounding the attempt to kidnap Benedict Arnold.

Lt. John McWhorter, "Campaign of the Ten Thousand," in *The Military Engineer*, January-February 1939 (XXXI, 24-28). Condensed account of Xenophon's *Anabasis*. The story of a "marching democracy" which fought and marched 5,000 miles in enemy territory in two years.

Major John H. Nankivell, "Fort Garland, Colorado," in *The Colorado Magazine*, January 1939 (XVI, 13-28). Well documented post history.

Mark Plaisted, Jr., "Lincoln, the Soldier," in *The Illinois Guardsman*, February 1939.

Don Russell, ed., "Letters of a Drummer-Boy" (H. L. Bert, 47th Indiana Volunteer Infantry), in *Indiana Magazine of History*, September 1939 (XXXIV, 324-39).

Brig. Gen. E. D. Scott, "Wounded Knee: A Look at the Record," in *The Cavalry Journal*, January-February 1939 (XLVIII, 18-30). Detailed account of the Indian fight, written as a reply to recent allegations of "massacre."

S. Morley Scott, "Material Relating to Quebec in the Gage and Amherst Papers," in the *Canadian Historical Review*, December 1938 (XIX, 378-386). Survey of the papers of Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief of all His Majesty's forces in North America from 1763 to 1775 and those of his predecessor, General Amherst. The papers of these two commanders are particularly valuable for students of military administration, for the regimental historian, as well as the antiquarian and genealogist. The collection surveyed (part of the William L. Clements Library collection) gives the best composite picture available of the political and military scene at the eve of the American Revolution.

Master Sergeant Morris Swett, "The Forerunners of Sill," in *The Field Artillery Journal*, November-December 1938 (XXVIII, 453-63). Review of field artillery training in the U. S.

Frederick Bernays Wiener, "Decline of a Leader: The Case of General Meade," in *Infantry Journal*, November-December 1938 and January-February 1939 (XLV, 534-42 and XLVI, 44-53).

Lt. Col. Charles A. Willoughby, "Twenty Million Reds," in *Infantry Journal*, January-February 1939 (XLVI, 58-64). Review of present day organization of the army of the U.S.S.R.

William Yale, "Palestine: Some Aspects of the Military Problem," in *Infantry Journal*, January-February 1939 (XLVI, 16-21). Brief survey of the current struggle in Palestine.

Gertrude W. Ackermann, "George Northrup, Frontier Scout," in *Minnesota History*, December 1938 (XIX, 377-92).

Rodney Gilbert, "The War in China Continues," in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1939 (XVII, 321-35). Review of the current struggle by a newspaper correspondent in China.

NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE MARKINGS OF ENGLISH CANNON CAPTURED AT YORKTOWN

(Continued from Volume II, 239)

Photographs 6 and 7 are of two 5.8-inch howitzers, and photograph 5 is that of a 6-pounder. All three were cast during the regime of John, Viscount Ligonier.

Sir John Ligonier was made Lieutenant General of Ordnance on April 22, 1748 and remained in that office until November 30, 1757. At the time he was appointed Lieutenant General he was not of sufficient rank to permit him to wear a coronet, but being a Knight of the Bath he used the ribbon of the order with its inscription, "*Tria Juncta In Uno*," and placed within its circle the block letter "L" to form his monogram (6). On November 30, 1757 he was made Master General of Ordnance and created a viscount. Hence, in picture 7 you see his monogram, but with a viscount's coronet placed above the ribbon of the Order of the Bath. Also here you see the ribbon of the Order of the Bath forming a complete circle, whereas on the previous guns it was tied in a fancy loop.


Photograph 5 is of a 6-pounder, cast in 1761. Here is another type of monogram of Lord Viscount Ligonier. He uses the viscount's coronet, but a letter "L," in French script, is placed under the coronet. John, Viscount Ligonier, remained in office as Master General of Ordnance until November 30, 1763.

Photograph 8 is that of a 5.8-inch howitzer cast by R. Gilpin in 1758. R. Gilpin was also a master founder in Woolwich. This howitzer has the cypher and the royal crown of George II on the reinforce, and the ducal coronet and block letter "M," with a scroll under the letter, on the chase. This is the initial of the Duke of Marlborough. Charles, Duke of Marlborough was Master General of Ordnance from May 10, 1755 to November 30, 1757. Although the gun was cast after his term of office had expired, his coronet and monogram on the gun are justified. When we consider the length of time it took to prepare the core, to dry it properly, and to prepare the flask for casting, it could have run well into the following year before it was completed. The founder's name and year when cast



ENGLISH 6-POUNDER, BRONZE, MADE
BY R. GILPIN, 1761

Crown and monogram of George III on the
breech; monogram of Viscount John Ligonier on
the chase (5).



ENGLISH 5.8-INCH HOWITZER, BRONZE

Made by W. Bowen, 1755. Crown and mono-
gram of George II; monogram of Sir John
Ligonier, before he became a Viscount, on the
chase (6).



ENGLISH 5.8-INCH HOWITZER, BRONZE

Made by R. Gilpin, 1760. Crown and monogram
of George II on reinforced field; monogram of
Viscount John Ligonier on the chase (7).



ENGLISH 5.8-INCH HOWITZER, BRONZE,


MADE BY GILPIN, 1758

Crown and monogram of George II, with crown
and monogram of Charles, Duke of Marlborough
on chase (8).



ENGLISH 12-POUNDER, BRONZE, MADE BY W. BOWEN, 1759

Royal coat of arms of George II on the
breech (9a).



Coat of arms of Lord George Sackville on the
chase (9b).



ENGLISH 12-POUNDER, BRONZE, MADE BY W. BOWEN, 1767

Royal coat of arms of George II on the
breech (10a).



Coat of arms of John, Marquis of Granby on the
chase (10b).

were not placed on the base ring until the gun had been turned and completed. This was cut by an engraver. All embossing was cast in the mould and shaped and cleaned afterwards.

Photographs 9a and 9b are of a 12-pounder cast in 1759 by W. Bowen. On the breech it has the royal coat of arms of George II; on the chase it has the ducal coat of arms of Lord George Sackville. Lord George Sackville was Lieutenant General of Ordnance from November 30, 1757 to September 10, 1759. This is the celebrated Lafayette gun. General Lafayette when in America in 1824 visited Watervliet Arsenal at Troy, New York. According to tradition, he recognized this piece as one of the original Yorktown guns. The gun has a large dent on the side near the breech resulting from a direct hit by a cannon ball. The gun also bears the inscription showing that it was surrendered by the capitulation at Yorktown, October, 1781.

Photograph 10b shows the coat of arms of John, Marquis of Granby. John, Marquis of Granby, was Lieutenant General of Ordnance from September 10, 1759 to September 10, 1763, and held the office of Master General of Ordnance from November 10, 1763 to the year 1770, when he died. In this instance the coat of arms is that of the Duke of Rutland, who also held the title of Marquis of Granby. The title of Marquis was usually given to the oldest son, hence, John, the son of the Duke of Rutland, would use the family coat of arms, but placed a marquis' coronet above the shield instead of the ducal. John, Marquis of Granby, was a general in the army and attained high military reputation as commander in chief of the British forces serving under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick.


THOR BORRESEN

*Colonial National Historical Park,
Yorktown, Virginia*

AN IDENTIFICATION DISC FOR THE ARMY, 1862

The identification of the dead after battle has always been a partially unsolved problem of administration in the history of modern warfare. In the American Civil War, this problem appears to have been one of particular magnitude. The system of identifying the slain by means of personal possessions or by other sources of information found on the bodies by burial parties, was inadequate even under favorable conditions. Although early in the war, orders were issued requiring all commanding generals in the field to set off burial grounds for the dead immediately after each engagement, this regulation recognized the obvious difficulties of identification. In substance it directed that all graves be marked by some form of headboard, and "when practicable," the names of the persons buried should be inscribed on these grave markers. From the markers, registers of the burials were to be preserved, "in which will be noted the marks corresponding with the headboards."¹

¹ General Orders, No. 33, April 3, 1862, War Department, *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. II, 2.



The tag proposed by Kennedy.

The tag as used in the A.E.F.

A number of obstacles prevented the satisfactory identification of the bodies so interred. Frequently men did not carry on their persons articles which could serve to identify them. Burial parties were often composite details from various units, whose members could not recognize more than a few of their fallen comrades, and had to rely upon whatever items of personal belongings that they found on the bodies left on the field. Frequently the dead were so disfigured by their wounds and exposure to the sun as to be beyond recognition, even by members of their own companies and squads. Finally, the destruction or disfigurement of identifying papers or other articles often accompanied the fatal wounding of the individual soldier, thus rendering hopeless any possibility of identifying the man after death.

Another problem also arose, in the case of the removal of bodies hastily buried after battle, for interment in permanent cemeteries. When records were lost or were unreliable, the remains temporarily buried on the field could not be identified later, thus making the transfer to permanent cemeteries almost impossible in some cases.

These difficulties were recognized by a citizen of New York, John Kennedy, who wrote to Secretary of War Stanton on May 3, 1862, offering a proposal for an identification disc to be issued to all officers and men in the Federal army.² This letter, enclosing a drawing illustrating his plan, reveals an article of field equipment identical with that prescribed by regulations more than forty years later, and with slight modifications, identical with the disc used by American troops in the World War, and in our army at the present day.

² War Dept., Sect. War, Doc. File, 1862-K-206 [formerly in AGO, now in The National Archives].

75 South Street,
New York, May 3rd, 1862

Hon. E. M. Stanton,

Sec. of War,

Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir: Enclosed please find a plan of a badge or medal which I propose getting up for distribution in the Army for the purpose of obviating the difficulty already experienced at Bull's Run in identifying the bodies of the slain after burial—It is intended to be of metal and worn by the soldier under his clothing. It will simplify the record kept by the burial squad and enable the friends of the Patriotic dead to identify their remains even in after years—It has been highly approved by all the Military men to whom I have shown it—It has also been endorsed by the Union defence Committee of this city—I have no doubt sir but your own intelligence will enable you to see at once that their can be no difficulty hereafter in identifying the bodies of soldiers wearing the "Kennedy badge." The object of this letter is to solicit permission from the department to visit the army with the necessary tools to strike them off and distribute them to the officers and men with the necessary condition of proof of my loyalty and devotion to the Union Cause—As the object to be attained suggests under the existing state of affairs promptness of action I would most respectfully request and early reply and a favorable consideration

Respectfully Yours

JNO. KENNEDY

P. S. Of course the name title & is different from the specimen as they are to be stamped upon the ground to represent the wearer.

Despite the obvious value of the suggestion, which has been fully proven by subsequent usage, Kennedy's request for permission to furnish the army with these discs was summarily refused. Assistant Secretary of War Watson notified Kennedy on May 6 that the request could not be granted. No reason for the refusal was given.³


Forty-four years later, the War Department issued orders adopting the first identification disc in the American army. This order, dated December 20, 1906, required that "an aluminum identification tag, the size of a silver half dollar and of suitable thickness, stamped with the name, rank, company, regiment, or corps of the wearer, will be worn by each officer and enlisted man of the Army whenever the field kit is worn, the tag to be suspended from the neck, underneath the clothing, by a cord or thong passed through a small hole in the tag."⁴ From the specifications named in this order, it may be seen that the tag first adopted by the Army was practically identical with that offered by Kennedy. Though subsequent regulations replaced the name, rank, and organization, with a serial number, the principle of the identification disc, as applied to American forces, may justly be said to have had its origin in the unheeded proposal of John Kennedy in May, 1862.

F. STANSBURY HAYDON

The Johns Hopkins University

³ Draft of reply filed with Kennedy to Sec. War, May 3, 1862, *loc. cit.*

⁴ General Orders No. 204, December 20, 1906, War Department, AGO.



AN EARLY COLONIAL HELMET

Illustrated is a steel helmet of the type known as "cabasset," recovered from an exploratory trench during excavations for the Fusileers' Redoubt within Colonial National Historical Park at Yorktown, Virginia. The headpiece was forged by an armourer from a single billet of metal and in the opinion of Mr. Stephen Grancsay, Curator, Department of Arms and Armour, Metropolitan Museum of Art, dates from about 1600. Helmets of somewhat later date were made in two pieces.

Nicolas Martiau, a French military engineer in the employ of the Virginia Company, came in 1631 to build a fort upon the York River at a point within the present limits of the town. He probably brought with him beside those who were to labor upon the stockade, a guard, composed of colonists employed as soldiers, protected from a chance Indian arrow by helmet, breast and back plate, procured by the Company most likely from stocks of old armour stored in London. The helmet shown may be regarded as one of the earliest examples of military head gear used in American colonial warfare.

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*Colonial National Historical Park,
Yorktown, Virginia*